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THE  ECONOMIC DOMINANCE  of the state sector makes its behavior  and 
response  crucial  to the course of reform  in the economies of Central  and 
Eastern  Europe. This paper  examines the special case of Poland  in the 
three  years  following  the "big  bang"  of January  1, 1990.  The big bang-a 
program  of radical  reform  to create  the legal, institutional,  and  economic 
basis for a market economy-was  instrumental  in changing relative 
prices, introducing  foreign competition,  and signaling  that tight mone- 
tary  and  fiscal  policies would  be pursued.  However, changes  in the own- 
ership  and governance of state manufacturing  companies have lagged 
behind. 
This  delay in privatizing  has raised  concerns  because the state sector 
has played a central role in Poland. In 1990, the first year of Poland's 
reform  program,  state manufacturing  accounted  for some 30 percent  of 
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GDP, 19  percent  of employment,  85 percent  of exports, and 60 percent 
of fiscal revenues. Unless rapidly privatized, many analysts argued, 
state manufacturing  firms  would not respond  to the new economic envi- 
ronment, would decapitalize companies by paying out surpluses as 
wages, and  would  then use their  bargaining  power to negotiate  a bailout 
with the government.  The resulting  fiscal burden  would thus sabotage 
macroeconomic  stability. 
This paper presents evidence that state-owned enterprises  (SOEs) 
have been much more responsive  than  these fears implied.  This finding 
suggests that hard  budgets and import  competition-essential  ingredi- 
ents of Poland's  reform  package-can  exert adjustment  pressures  even 
when changes  in ownership  and governance  lag behind.  Two points are 
worth  stressing  along  with this finding.  First, credible  and sustained  en- 
forcement  of hard  budgets  and competition  is difficult  politically.  ' Pres- 
sures  occur  constantly  to reintroduce  soft loans and  protection.  Second, 
the finding  does not mean  that hard  budgets  and competition  are substi- 
tutes for changes in governance.  Both, presumably,  are necessary. But 
at least in Poland's  case, the prospect  of changes  in governance  has pro- 
vided the needed incentives  even before such changes  have occurred. 
Thus far, privatization  has been the most successful in services and 
in retail trade (although  even here the change consists of leasing state 
shops to private operators). Privatization  of manufacturing  has been 
slow and  contentious,  with  the mass  privatization  program  (MPP)  aimed 
at transforming  large state firms  mired in debate and legislative wran- 
gling. The next section describes the main features of our sample of 
state-owned  enterprises.  The section  after  that  discusses evolving  enter- 
prise sector issues during the first three years of  Poland's reform 
program. 
The Sample 
The evidence in this paper  is drawn  from  a direct survey of 75 SOEs 
scattered  throughout  Poland  and  from  five different  manufacturing  sec- 
tors with great diversity in product lines and locale. Appendix A de- 
1. "Competition"  refers  to import  competition.  Poland  has  espoused  domestic  compe- 
tition  and  free  entry,  but  import  competition  has  been  a much  stronger  force  than  domestic 
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scribes  the sample.  We first  visited the enterprises  in the summer  of 1991 
and revisited  them in August  and September  of 1992.  Our  analysis cov- 
ers the three-year  period  from  June 1989  to June 1992:  six months  before 
the start  of the reform  program  and two-and-one-half  years into it. The 
enterprises  in our sample  represent  the core of the manufacturing  estab- 
lishment that accounts for 40 to 60 percent of Polish manufacturing. 
They were chosen from the five biggest manufacturing  sectors and are 
large  companies  that  would usually  be listed in the Lista 500 (the Polish 
equivalent  of Fortune 500, the largest companies based on sales). We 
excluded giants such as the huge tractor  company URSUS, as well as 
the biggest shipyards  and steel mills. 
The companies  in the sample  are visible, well-known  firms  from the 
upper  echelons of Polish manufacturing.  They exhibited  similar  behav- 
ior before  the reform  was launched  and shared  similar  initial  conditions 
at the start of the reform. Moreover, they embody many of the more 
complex problems  in transforming  and restructuring  manufacturing  be- 
cause of their  size and  bargaining  power with the government.  Their  be- 
havior  will not only influence  the response  of smaller  SOEs but will also 
affect the credibility  of the reform  program.  The companies  at the bot- 
tom of the financial  heap in this group would be typical targets  for the 
enterprise-bank  restructuring  effort  underway  in Poland. 
These companies  also would  be potential  candidates  for the mass pri- 
vatization  program.  This effort is designed to transfer  a big chunk of 
state assets into  private  hands  under  the direction  of national  investment 
funds (NIFs), which would manage  and help restructure  the companies 
in the interim.  As a necessary intermediate  stage, state firms  would be 
commercialized:  transformed  into  joint stock companies  wholly owned 
by the Treasury.2  All the sample  firms  were SOEs at the start  of the eco- 
nomic reform. By mid-1992,  of the 64 firms  responding  to our second 
survey, 3 were privatized, 24 were commercialized,  and 37 were still 
SOEs. 
An important  fact about  Polish  SOEs is that  they are "self-governing" 
under  the direction  of a workers' council that hires and fires the man- 
ager,  determines  managers'  compensation,  and  clears  all important  stra- 
tegic and even operating  decisions. SOEs do not receive any special fi- 
2. Frydman,  Rapaczynski,  and  Earle  (1993)  provide  details  on the mass privatization 
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nancial  treatment  or outside intervention  in their management.  To the 
contrary, in addition to the rigors of macroeconomic stringency and 
competition, SOEs have been subject to a dividend  (a misnomer  for a 
minimum  asset tax on the share  of the company's  equity  that  is centrally 
financed)  and  an excess wage tax (a punishing  penalty  on wage increases 
above a certain  limit;  in 1990,  this carried  a maximum  marginal  tax rate 
of 500  percent). 
Commercialized  companies  differ  in three  respects  from  SOEs. First, 
the workers'  council is dissolved and replaced  by a supervisory  board; 
four  members  are  nominated  by the Ministry  of Privatization  (MOP)  and 
two by the employees. Second, the enterprise  is transferred  to the con- 
trol  of the Ministry  and  must  be privatized  within  two years. Third,  com- 
mercialized  firms  were originally  to be exempt from the fixed dividend 
and instead pay a percentage of  after-tax profits to the Treasury; 
they also receive a tax break  of 20  percent  on excess wage tax payments. 
Seduced by these advantages,  a rash of firms  raced to be commercial- 
ized at the end of 1990. The sections below provide evidence of such 
self-selection from the sample. Eventually the dividend tax rate for 
SOEs was reduced  from  32  percent  in 1990  to 22  percent  in 1991;  it fell to 
10  percent  in July 1992.  Meanwhile,  the dividend  from commercialized 
companies  was reassessed as a form of asset tax. At the same time, the 
highest marginal  excess wage tax rate was lowered to 300 percent and 
the capacity  to exceed norm  wages has diminished  along  with enterprise 
profitability  and  liquidity.  The enthusiasm  for being  commercialized  has 
waned along with the tax advantages.  Commercialization  has also oc- 
curred in preparation  for the mass privatization  program.  However, 
with this effort  mired  in heated debate  and the Ministry  of Privatization 
increasingly  reluctant  to take more SOEs under  its wing, such top-down 
commercialization  has also slowed down.3 
In practical terms, SOEs and commercialized firms differ only 
slightly  in terms  of governance.4  In well-run  SOEs, the de facto balance 
of power has shifted  in favor of the manager-a turn  of events that  is not 
surprising  in view of the scarcity  of managerial  talent in Poland  and the 
3. Thus  after  two years of vacillating,  the Polish Sejm  (parliament)  rejected  the mass 
privatization  program  on March  18, 1993;  however, the program  was successfully  resub- 
mitted  by the government  and  approved  on April  30, 1993. 
4. Dabrowski,  Fedorowicz,  and Levitas (1991);  Frydman  and Wellisz (1991);  Pinto, 
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rising  fear of unemployment.  In addition,  most firms  were commercial- 
ized in mid-1991.  This  left only one year  of sample  performance-inade- 
quate  to trace  the impact  of a change  in governance. 
Evolving Issues  in the Enterprise Sector 
The big bang of 1990  was followed by an immediate  and big drop in 
manufacturing  output;  declines continued  until the middle  of the year. 
Surprisingly,  bankruptcies  did  not occur and  enterprises  appeared  to be 
doing  well financially.  The government  budget  ran  a surplus,  and  foreign 
exchange reserves were growing rapidly. A relaxation of macroeco- 
nomic stringency  after mid-year  led to a huge increase in wages.' The 
main  questions  were whether  the financial  performance  was sustainable 
and whether  in the absence of an owner, firms  would be decapitalized. 
Economists  David Lipton  and  Jeffrey  Sachs argued  that  rapid  privatiza- 
tion would  prevent  workers  and  managers  from  squandering  state assets 
and ensure that privatization  did not get paralyzed  in endless debate.6 
Based on actual  state sector performance  during  the first  seven months 
of the reform  program,  Roman Frydman  and Stanislaw Wellisz con- 
cluded  that  the ownership  and  control  structure  of SOEs  were incompat- 
ible with rationalization  and growth. Expansionary policies would 
merely  lead to higher  wages and inflation,  with little increase  in output. 
Macroeconomic  stringency  would  not achieve much  without  new incen- 
tives for maximizing  the value of the firm.7 
In 1991,  the trading  arrangements  between the former  Soviet Union 
and its satellite states collapsed.8  A large and abrupt  fall in enterprise 
profitability  occurred as hidden Council for Mutual Economic Assis- 
tance (CMEA) subsidies on energy and inputs vanished and the tradi- 
tional  market  for many  Polish  firms  was lost as payments  switched  from 
the old transferable  ruble system to hard currency at international 
prices. It became  clear  that 1990  performance  had  been temporary,  sup- 
ported by a onetime inflationary  gain on stocks, implicit CMEA sub- 
5. See Pinto, Coricelli,  and de la Calle (1990);  Pinto, Belka, and Krajewski  (1992); 
Schaffer  (1992);  and  Wellisz,  Kierzkowski,  and  Okolski  (1991). 
6. Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990a,  b). Hinds  (1990)  made  a similar  call to arms. 
7. Frydman  and  Wellisz  (1991). 
8. Under  the CMEA,  Poland  obtained  energy  and  inputs  at  far  below  world  prices  plus 
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sidies, and devaluation  gains on pre-reform  dollar  accounts that enter- 
prises had held. The key question now was whether state enterprises 
had  the supply-response  capacity  and  ability  to adapt  to the new market 
conditions.  A review of state enterprise  performance  in mid-1991,  some 
18 months after Poland's big bang, would seem to have confirmed  the 
worst fears about  the inertness  and  perverse  behavior  of SOEs. Unsold 
inventories were piling up, and sales and profitability  were declining 
sharply. Macroeconomic stringency, a cornerstone of the economic 
transformation  program  (ETP), seemed not to be eliciting  any response 
from SOEs. Poland  appeared  to be headed  for a high inflation  collapse 
presaged  by rising  fiscal deficits  and deteriorating  bank  portfolios. Dis- 
appointed with the response of SOEs, the government  devalued the 
zloty by 17  percent  against  the dollar  in May 1991,  the first  relaxation  of 
the celebrated  fixed exchange rate anchor since the big bang. Later in 
the year, Poland  adopted  a preannounced  crawl  in the exchange  rate.9 
After conducting  our first set of visits to enterprises  in mid-1991,  we 
concluded that the inspiration  and moving force behind change were 
managers.  We found  that  attitudes  had shifted  in favor  of making  profits 
and pursuing  marketing,  rather  than exclusively emphasizing  produc- 
tion targets  as under  the old regime.  We also found  that  a serious  princi- 
pal-agent  problem  existed because managers  served at the pleasure of 
the workers' council and there was insufficient  emphasis on the long- 
term viability of enterprises. We emphasized the importance  of ad- 
dressing  firm-level  managerial  incentives  and empowering  managers.  10 
In 1992, some good news started  emerging  from the manufacturing 
sector, despite negligible  privatization  and the absence of banking  re- 
form. Not only did Poland  end the year with a substantial  increase  in in- 
dustrial  output, but surveys of business anticipations  that polled large 
samples  of companies-mostly  SOEs-indicated that  optimism  was in- 
creasing.  I  I 
9.  Ironically,  this relaxation  helped  to stabilize  and even slightly  depreciate  the real 
exchange  rate;  it also coincided  with a recovery  in sales. In retrospect,  it is evident  that 
firms  had  indeed  taken  serious  adjustment  steps  before  the devaluation,  even though  these 
measures  had  not yet shown  up in the financial  bottom  line. Adjustment  takes  time. 
10. Pinto, Belka, and Krajewski  (1992).  For other comments  on state enterprise  be- 
havior  see Dabrowski,  Fedorowicz,  and  Levitas  (1991),  who  examine  a sample  of 50  firms, 
and  Schaffer  (1992). 
11. Business  Survey Poland (1992). Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  219 
Three fundamental forces  can help explain why  SOEs are re- 
sponding,  even though  managers  have neither  an ownership  stake  in the 
company nor compensation  linked to profits. First is the adjustment 
force exerted by hard  budgets-even  when changes in governance  lag 
behind. Second is the importance  of big bang methods, which rapidly 
achieve relative price changes anchored  to foreign prices; these auto- 
matically  set performance  targets  for prices, costs, and  quality.  Third  is 
managers'  expectations  that performance  will be rewarded  once priva- 
tization  occurs. 
In interpreting  this sample, our paper helps explain several issues. 
First, some analysts suspected  that macroeconomic  stringency  was not 
translating  into hard budgets at the firm  level because of "soft" bank 
loans and interfirm  credit. Our  evidence shows that bank  and interfirm 
loans, while lax through  1991,  are credibly  hardening.  Tax arrears  have 
been increasing.  But such arrears  do not represent  additional  funds and 
this applies only to the weakest firms. Second, there was a fear that 
worker-dominated  SOEs would lack the will to shed labor or improve 
efficiency through  investment. Our  findings  show this fear to be false. 
Third,  wages have not been set to exhaust  the surplus;  rather,  wage set- 
ting has come to resemble  bargaining  outcomes commonly  seem in the 
West. Fourth, firms  have been cost-conscious and have improved  the 
efficiency  of energy  and  materials  usage. 
Our  findings  question  the assumption  that greater  hard  currency  ex- 
ports are necessarily an index of greater  adjustment.  We also discuss 
other key transformation  issues such as the role of banks, excess wage 
taxation,  and  managerial  incentives. 
Adjustment  and Financial Performance 
A sharp transition  from a centrally planned to a market economy 
would entail some dislocation  in manufacturing  as the arbitrary  alloca- 
tion  of resources  that  had  prevailed  before  reform  bent  to market  forces. 
Eventually  if hard  budgets  and  market-determined  relative  prices work, 
success stories could be expected to emerge. This is exactly what is oc- 
curring  three years into Poland's  economic transformation  program.  In 
each manufacturing  sector, successful and less successful firms  are in- 
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Early  in the ETP, profitability  would have been a flawed  indicator  of 
performance  because various temporary  factors supported  the unsus- 
tainable  paper  profits  of 1990.  However, by 1992,  with the evaporation 
of  inflationary  gains and the implicit subsidies from CMEA trade, 
profitable  financial  performance  could be interpreted  as a sign of health 
and  even adjustment. 
Based on financial  performance  during  the last six months  of the sam- 
ple period,  we classified  firms  three  ways: 
AAA: Firms  with positive retained  earnings  (net profit)  in January- 
June 1992. 
AA:  Firms with positive pretax (gross) profit in January-June 
1992,  but negative  net profit. 
A:  Firms with negative pretax (gross) profit in January-June 
1992.12 
We  found  31  AAA firms,  8 AA firms,  and  25 A firms.  Table 1  summarizes 
the characteristics  of these groups  and appendix  A provides  further  in- 
formation. 
An important  feature  of the AAA firms  is that they defy any simple 
classification.  These firms  include consumer  and producer  goods com- 
panies;  heavy and  light  industry;  those that  were heavily  affected  by the 
collapse of the CMEA and those that were not; exporters  to the West 
and those whose markets  are predominantly  domestic. The dominant 
explanatory  factor of profit  performance  in the early part  of the ETP- 
sectoral origin-is  irrelevant  today. Notably, roughly  half the A firms 
are light manufacturers,  making such products as shoes and textiles. 
Firms  in this group  also produce  a broad  cross-section of products,  but 
these firms  employ significantly  more workers, on average, than AAA 
or AA firms  and have much  lower sales. The A firms  do not necessarily 
lack good prospects. Their  fortunes could depend upon suitable  finan- 
cial and labor arrangements  and other restructuring,  as we discuss 
below. 
Our  finding  that within  each sector some firms  are doing well while 
others are not faring  as well is a sure sign that  the pre-reform  allocation 
of resources  is now bending  to market  forces. Initially,  sectors  responded 
12. Net profit  is retained  earnings  after  paying  corporate  income  tax, the dividend  (a 
misnomer  for a minimum  asset tax paid to the government),  and the excess wage tax. 
Gross  profit  is pretax  profit.  See appendix  B for  complete  definitions  of these terms,  which 
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Table 1. Characteristics  of Polish  Enterprises  in the Sample 
Financial performance  a 
Characteristic  A  AA  AAA 
Average salesb  55  99  103 
Avg. employmentc  3,300  2,890  2,939 
Sectoral  origin 
Metallurgy  4  4  5 
Electromachinery  5  0  5 
Chemicals  2  1  10 
Light industry  12  0  3 
Food processing  2  3  8 
Governance 
Privatized  1  0  2 
Commercialized  10  1  13 
State-owned  14  7  16 
Main products  Semifinished  steel  Raw and semi-  Processed  ferrous 
products,  raw steel,  processed steel  and nonferrous 
processed steel  products,  steel  products,  refrigera- 
products,  buses,  pipes, fertilizers,  tors, ovens, heavy 
trailers,  machine  meat products,  and  engines, trans- 
tools, construction  sugar.  formers,  wires and 
equipment,  man-  cables, paints  and 
made fibers, plas-  varnishes,  tires, fer- 
tics, hosiery, shoes,  tilizer, floor tiles, 
textiles, threads,  finished  garments, 
woolen threads,  cigarettes,  sweets 
and sugar.  and chocolates, and 
processed  meat. 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on survey  of firms.  See appendix  A for more  information  on the sample  and 
a further  discussion  of the data. 
a. Financial  performance  was based  on gross or net profit  data  for January  to June 1992.  AAA firms  showed  net 
profit;  AA firms  showed  positive  gross profit,  but negative  net profit;  and  A firms  showed  negative  gross profit. 
b. Average  sales are in millionis  of dollars. 
c. Average  employment  was calcuilated  as of June 1992. 
resiliently  to the reform  shocks, depending  upon  the relative  strength  of 
various  starting  points  such as dollar  accounts, inventories  carried  over, 
and special access to the captive CMEA market, which lasted until 
March 1991. Now free market  forces are beginning  to sort things out, 
and  factors within  eachfirm (such as management  actions), rather  than 
sectoral  origin,  are becoming  the main  determinant  of performance. 
Of the 64 firms  that responded  to our second survey, 3 were privat- 
ized, 24 were commercialized  (wholly owned by the Treasury),  and 37 
were still SOEs. Among  the 39 AAA and AA companies,  2 were privat- 
ized, 14  were commercialized,  and 23 were SOEs. The least successful 
A group  contained  a significant  number  of commercialized  firms, indi- 222  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
cating  that  a change  in governance  by itself does not guarantee  improved 
financial  performance.  Managers  in all groups expressed a preference 
for commercialization  and consider privatization  inevitable  and desir- 
able, but overwhelmingly  believe that  prior  restructuring  is necessary. 
In the next section, we correlate  key facets of adjustment  with the 
three  firm  groupings.  Because the sample  contains  only a small  number 
of AA firms,  we focus on the two extremes:  AAA and  A. 
Labor Adjustment: Real  Sales,  Productivity,  and  Unit Labor Cost 
The big bang was accompanied  by an immediate  and sharp  drop in 
industrial  output measured  by real sales. This was an economy-wide 
phenomenon, resulting eventually in a 12 percent decline in GDP in 
1990.1'  But the drop  in output  was not matched  by labor shedding;  this 
led to declining  productivity  and eventually,  rising  unit  labor  cost. 
Results in the sample followed this general pattern. However, em- 
ployment  reduction  has continued  while sales have gradually  stabilized. 
Figure 1 plots real sales for selected months for the AAA, AA, and A 
firms.  For AAA firms,  real sales hit rock bottom  in April 1991  and have 
been rebounding  since; this movement  coincides with the relaxation  of 
the fixed nominal  exchange  rate  anchor  with the first  devaluation  during 
the reform  in May 1991  and a switch to a preannounced  crawl in Octo- 
ber. AA firms  recovered somewhat in 1992. A firms  were on a down- 
trend throughout  the period. The difference  is evident in productivity. 
Between September  1989  and June 1992,  AAA firms  nearly  maintained 
productivity  levels (falling  only 3 percent), while levels fell 15 percent 
for AA firms  and  40 percent  for A firms. 
Figure  2 plots the trend  in real unit  labor  cost. Wages  rose sharply  in 
13. Calvo and Coricelli  (1992)  argue  that the output  drop was caused by credit  con- 
straints,  while Blanchard  (1992),  Berg and Blanchard  (1992),  and Kharas  (1991)  make a 
strong  case for an aggregate  demand  shock. Bruno  (1992)  is more  balanced,  citing  factors 
both  on the supply  and  demand  sides. Pinto,  Belka,  and  Krajewski  (1991, 1992)  cite inter- 
views with managers  and use firm-level  data to conclude that the high nominal  interest 
rates  on working  capital  (50 to 72 percent  per  month  for January  1990  alone)  led to a rush 
to liquidate  zloty loans;  repayment  implied  a certain  return  of 50 to 72 percent,  preferable 
to producing  and  selling  in a highly  uncertain  environment.  Nominal  wages  were  frozen  to 
absorb  the  jump in interest  and input  costs accompanying  the big bang, leading  to a de- 
mand  squeeze  through  a drastic  fall in real  wages. Rising  finished  goods stocks and  higher 
exports  in the face of declining  profitability  indicate  the emergence  of domestic  demand 
constraints,  but  the nominal  interest  rate  and  price  level shocks  of the big bang  had  a defi- 
nite  impact. Figure 1.  Real Sales of Firms, September 1989-June  1992 
Index, September 1989= 100 
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Table  2. Employment  of Firms  in the Survey,  December  1989-June  1992 
Index, September  1989= 100 
Financial  December  June  December  June  December  June 
performance  1989  1990  1990  1991  1991  1992 
AAA  101.7  95.1  93.4  87.4  84.4  79.4 
AA  99.7  98.7  95.2  87.3  78.5  76.5 
A  100.1  95.9  88.5  81.9  74.0  67.1 
Total  100.8  95.8  91.3  84.7  78.8  73.2 
Source: Authors' calculations  based on firms in the survey, which are sorted according  to their financial 
performance. 
1989, especially  in the last quarter as  SOEs  believed  year-end wages 
would form the basis for wage increases  during the ETP. But there was 
a  sales  boom,  keeping  unit labor costs  in check.  The  big bang was 
marked by a huge increase  in the prices of materials and energy and a 
more than threefold increase in interest rates, which ranged from 50 to 
72 percent for the month of January 1990 alone.  Firms froze  nominal 
wages as a shock absorber; this led to a sharp drop in unit labor costs. 
However,  as fears  of bankruptcy receded,  real wages  and unit labor 
costs  grew  rapidly-until  the  end  of  1990.'4  After  mid-1991,  the  trend 
has been  downward,  indicating that all firms in the sample are taking 
measures to control labor costs,  including restraining wages,  shedding 
labor, and maintaining output. In comparing the two extremes,  the per- 
formance of AAA firms is decidedly  superior to that of A firms. 
As table 2 shows,  substantial labor shedding has occurred-despite 
the presence  of workers'  councils.  For the total sample, labor was re- 
duced  by a remarkable 27 percent,  with  the labor-intensive  A group 
leading the way. However,  this group has also been plagued with the big- 
gest marketing problems, which have led to falling productivity. 
Materials  and Energy Costs 
Table 3 contains the ratio of materials and energy costs  to sales for 
selected periods. In 1990, all three groups were level.  The dollarizing of 
CMEA prices (switching from administered transferable ruble prices to 
international dollar prices) and the removal of related implicit subsidies 
show up in the numbers for the first six months of 1991. After that, the 
14. Pinto  (1992)  contains  a discussion  of firm-level  wage-setting  behavior. 226  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table 3.  Ratio of Material and Energy Costs to Sales, January 1990-June  1992 
Percent 
January-  January-  January-  January- 
Financial  December  June  December  June 
performance  1990  1991  1991  1992 
AAA  52  58  50  45 
AA  47  60  61  50 
A  48  47  45  39 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on firms in the survey, which are sorted according  to their financial 
performance. 
ratios  decline, indicating  that  the efficiency  of materials  and  energy  con- 
sumption  is on the rise. It is remarkable  that A firms exhibit this in- 
creased  efficiency  as well. This leads us to conclude  that a key problem 
for A firms  is low capacity  utilization.  This is shown by the sharp  com- 
pression  of real sales, which continued  to decline in 1992.  As the data  in 
figure  2 and table 1 show, these firms  have a larger  labor  stock on aver- 
age and are plagued with inefficient labor usage, despite the much 
greater  labor  shedding  shown in table 2. 
Borrowing and Tax Arrears 
Many  observers  argued  during  1990  and  early 1991  that  the discipline 
of macroeconomic  stringency  was being  diluted  by bank  loans, interfirm 
credit,  and  the accumulation  of tax arrears.  In short, the firm-level  bud- 
get constraint  was not yet hard. Using sample evidence, this section 
concludes  that  the firm-level  budget  constraint,  while lax through  1991, 
is now marked  by three important  features: substantial  tightening  of 
bank  loans; leveling off of net interfirm  lending  by AAA firms;  and con- 
siderable  laxity in tax payments. 
Preceding  results  showed that  A firms  lagged  significantly  behind  AA 
and AAA firms  in maintaining  sales. As figure  3 shows, inventories  of 
finished  goods rose rapidly  for A firms  and then stabilized  at a high  pla- 
teau. This  pattern  contrasts  sharply  with AAA firms,  whose inventories 
initially  jumped  up in January  1990  from  the low, shortage-economy  lev- 
els, reached  a peak in April 1991,  and  then declined. Inventories  for AA 
firms  peaked in October 1991  and declined thereafter.  If the inventory 
accumulation  of A firms was financed  by working  capital loans or in- 
terfirm  borrowing,  this would indicate  softness in the budget  constraint. Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  227 
Figure 3.  Ratio of Finished Goods Inventories to Sales, December 1989-June  1992 
Percent 
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Figure 4.  Working Capital Loans, December 1989-June  1992 
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Figure  4 plots the path of nominal  working  capital  loans from banks 
for  the three  groups  of firms.  Comparing  AAA and  A firms,  January  1990 
was marked  by a modest nominal  increase in loans despite 110  percent 
producer  price inflation. Between January  and March 1990, loans to 
AAA firms  increased  rapidly,  coinciding  with  lower interest  rates. How- 
ever, A firms increased borrowing  much less. Thereafter,  the pattern 
was drastically  different.  In the 21 months  from March  1990  to Decem- 
ber 1991,  loans  to A firms  rose by 214  percent,  while  those for AAA firms 
rose 92 percent. This period coincided with the rapid  accumulation  of 
finished  goods stocks by A firms  noted above. 
The period from December 1991  to June 1992  was also remarkable. 
Working  capital  loans rose very slightly  for AAA firms  but fell slightly 
for A firms.  This suggests that the commercialization  in late 1991  of the 
nine banks  spun  off from  the National  Bank  of Poland  (the central  bank, 
and  before 1989,  Poland's  mono bank)  and the appointment  of supervi- 
sory boards, combined with closer monitoring  by the Ministry  of Fi- 
nance of the bad  loans portfolio,  were having  the desired  effects. 
Table  4 shows that  the ratio  of working  capital  loans to total  operating 
costs more  than  doubled  for A firms  between  March  1990  and  December 
1991, while almost no change occurred  for AAA firms. This suggests 
that the big increase in working  capital  loans to A firms  did not support 
a higher  level of activity, but was a result of rolling  over interest pay- 
ments as they fell due and  financing  growing  stocks of inventories. 
Figure  5 shows the investment  loans  from  banks  from  December  1989 
to June 1992.  AA firms'  borrowing  for investments  jumped at the start 
of the economic transformation  program  and then stagnated.  Between 
December 1989  and mid-1991,  investment  loans for A and AAA firms 
grew at about the same rate. Only after mid-1991  did investment  loans 
to AAA firms  begin  growing  faster  than  those for A firms.  The more  suc- 
cessful AAA firms  are presumably  investing. But the fact that A firms 
have been receiving  investment  loans as well, despite rapidly  dropping 
capacity utilization  and shrinking  profitability,  suggests that funds are 
being  used for other  purposes. 
Table 4 also examines the dynamics of net lending (interfirm  credit 
measured  as receivables minus  payables). The table confirms  the view 
that  such credit  served as a substitute  for bank  loans. This result shows 
up especially dramatically  in 1992,  when the curtailment  of bank  loans 
led A firms  to sharply  increase  interfirm  borrowing.  Lending  by the bet- 00  kr) -00 
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Figure 5.  Investment Loans, December 1989-June  1992 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on firms in the survey,  which are sorted according to financial performance. 
ter-off  AAA firms  stabilized  in 1992,  suggesting  that  they are exercising 
greater  caution. 
The last leakage at the microeconomic  level is tax arrears.  Table 5 
shows these arrears  to be substantial  for both AA and  A firms.  Because 
A firms  by definition  did not owe income tax in 1992,  we conclude that 
the arrears  stem from the dividend  and excess wage tax payments. By 
contrast,  AAA firms  are virtually  current  on tax payments. 
Interest Burden 
The evidence suggests that A firms financed growing inventories 
through  increased  working  capital  loans. Figure  6 plots the ratio  of inter- 
est payments  to profits  before interest and taxes. Beyond mid-1991,  A 
Table 5.  Ratio of Tax Arrears to Taxes Due, January 1990-June  1992 
Percent 
January-  January-  January- 
Financial  December  December  June 
performance  1990  1991  1992 
AAA  1.8  3.3  3.7 
AA  0.2  17.4  26.8 
A  5.0  42.7  50.8 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  firms  in  the  survey,  which  are  sorted  according  to  their  financial 
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Figure  6. Interest  Burden  of Firms, 1989:4-1992:2a 
Percent 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on firms  in the survey,  which  are sorted  according  to financial  performance. 
a. The interest  burden  is defined  as the ratio  of interest  payments  to profits  before  interest  and  taxes, where  both 
the numerator  and  the denominator  are cumulative  within  the year. 
firms  were unable  to meet interest  payments. For AAA firms,  this bur- 
den never exceeded 50 percent. 
Wage Setting  and Decapitalization 
Our  evidence suggests that the most profitable  firms  pay the highest 
excess wage tax (or PPWW)'5  but are the least decapitalized.  In fact, 
these firms  (the AAA firms)  are also the ones that have been investing 
the most. 
Table  6 shows that  for all three  groups  of firms,  average  wages for se- 
lected months were level at the beginning  of reforms.  AAA wages ran 
about  25 percent  ahead  of A wages by December 1991,  but the gap nar- 
rowed  to 17  percent  by June 1992.  By then, AAA firms  had actually  fro- 
zen nominal  wages, while AA and A firms  had increased such wages. 
Notably, the AAA wage in June 1992  was significantly  below the na- 
tional  average  of 2.4 million  zloty reported  by the Central  Statistical  Of- 
fice. Table 7 shows PPWW  per worker  for 1990, 1991,  and the first six 
montns  of 1992.  The table demonstrates  the link between higher  profits 
and  wages. 
15. The excess wage tax, better  known  by its Polish  acronym,  PPWW,  is a punishing 
progressive  tax paid  on wage awards  in excess of norm  wages. The highest  marginal  rate 
reaches  500 percent  (subsequently  lowered  to 400 percent  and then 300 percent).  Norm 
wages  are  determined  by fractional  indexation  to inflation.  September  1989  was chosen as 
the base month,  to neutralize  the wage  explosion  of the last quarter  of 1989  that  occurred 
in anticipation  of end-year  wages  being  used as the base. Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  233 
Table 6.  Average Wages for Firms in the Survey, December 1989-June  1992 
Thousands  of zlotys per worker 
Financial  December  June  December  June  December  June 
performance  1989  1990  1990  1991  1991  1992 
AAA  658  918  1,568  1,573  2,178  2,169 
AA  765  1,014  1,763  1,334  1,885  2,017 
A  603  852  1,395  1,440  1,737  1,858 
Source: Authors' calculations  based on firms in the survey, which are sorted according  to  their financial 
performance. 
Table 7.  Excess Wage Tax per Worker, January 1990-June  1992a 
Thousands  of zlotys 
January-  January-  January- 
Financial  December  December  June 
performance  1990  1991  1992 
AAA  3,655  6,500  1,635 
AA  5,675  4,740  219 
A  1,319  1,518  256 
Source: Authors' calculations  based on firms in the survey, which are sorted according  to their financial 
performance. 
a. The excess wage  tax, PPWW,  is a progressive  tax levied  on wages  exceeding  the norm  of wages. 
A useful  measure  of wage restraint  is provided  in figure  7, which  plots 
the share  of wage costs in a crude  measure  of gross value added  (GVA) 
(pretax profit plus depreciation plus wage costs equals gross value 
added).  The starting  point  for the graph  is artificially  low because of the 
stock profits  of late 1989  and  early 1990.  Moreover,  a huge compression 
of real wages occurred  in the first  quarter  of 1990  to offset the shock of 
higher  costs and  interest  rates. The collapse  of gross value added  under- 
lies the sharply  rising share of wage costs in gross value added for A 
firms, consuming  virtually  all the GVA by 1992. For AAA firms, this 
share  rose, but did so at a diminishing  rate. These results show that the 
higher  wages in AAA firms  are accompanied  by a maintenance  of sur- 
plus gross value added. This indicates a bargaining  solution by which 
surplus  is shared  between labor  and capital. 
Table  8 contains  two measures  of decapitalization.  The first  is the ra- 
tio of accrued  PPWW  to disposable  cash; this represents  the capacity  to 
pay PPWW  after  paying  income tax and the dividend,  and adding  back 
depreciation,  which is a noncash expense. The second compares ac- 
crued PPWW  payments to depreciation  (recall table 5 on tax arrears). 
According  to the first  measure, AAA firms  and AA firms  have roughly 234  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Figure 7.  Ratio of Wages to Gross Value Added,  1989:4-1992:2a 
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a.  The figure shows  wages  as a fraction of gross value added, defined as pretax profits plus depreciatiotn and wage 
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Table  8. Measuring  and Confirming  Decapitalization,  1990-92 
Percent 
January-  January-  January- 
Financial  December  December  June 
Ratio  peiformance  1990  1991  1992 
PPWW  to  AAA  10  19  8 
disposable  casha  AA  12  20  2 
A  7  -12  -4 
PPWW  to  AAA  90  48  18 
depreciation  AA  66  17  1 
A  36  13  4 
Investment  to  AAA  147  144  ... 
depreciation  AA  125  134 
A  82  80  ... 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on firms in the survey. 
a.  PPWW is the Polish excess  wage tax. Disposable  cash is defined as pretax profit minus income tax and dividends 
plus depreciation. 
the  same  results,  but A firms are clearly  in a state  of decapitalization.  (A 
firms  as  a group  had  pretax  losses  in  1991  and  1992.)  The  trend  of  the 
second  measure  is interesting.  All three  groups  displayed  a strong  down- 
ward  trend.  The  last  part of table  8 provides  further  evidence  of decapi- 
talization  in A firms.  Investments  comfortably  exceed  depreciation  for 
AAA  and AA  firms,  but are lower  for A firms in 1990 and  1991. 
From  these  findings,  we  draw  two  conclusions.  Profitable  companies 
are not prone  to decapitalization,  and the wage-setting  process  seems  to 
be  a  bargaining  solution  between  workers  and  management.  By  con- 
trast,  decapitalization  is  pronounced  in  firms  suffering  losses.  These 
firms  are also  heavily  indebted,  employ  the  largest  number  of workers, 
and  have  experienced  steady  declines  in their  real  sales.  Decapitaliza- 
tion  can thus  be interpreted  as more  of an adjustment  phenomenon  than 
a deliberate  attempt  to squander  state  assets. 
Success  Stories:  Good  Luck,  Good  Management, 
and  Governance 
The  sharp  contrast  between  the  performance  of  AAA  and  A firms  is 
underscored  by figure 8, which  plots  quarterly  underlying  profitability.  16 
16. Underlying  profitability  attempts  to track  the profit  rate on the basic business  of 
firms,  abstracting  from  sales of assets and  net extraordinary  gains.  See appendix  B. 236  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Figure 8.  Underlying Profitability of Firms, 1989:3-1992:2a 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on firms  in the survey,  which  are sorted  according  to financial  performance. 
a. Underlying  profitability  is measured  as pretax  profits  plus the turnover  tax minus  net other income and the 
balance  of extraordinary  gains,  expressed  as a percent  of sales. See appendix  B for more  information. 
Interestingly,  not much  difference  appeared  between AAA and A firms 
at the start  of the sample  period,  but  the gap  widened  with  time. Not sur- 
prisingly,  the ratio  of other income (mainly,  sales and leasing  of assets) 
to sales is the highest  for A firms.  Figure  9 plots this by quarter  for 1991 
and 1992. 
Good Luck 
The group  of AAA firms  has been dominated  by chemical and food 
sector companies,  while in the A group,  light  manufacturing  companies 
are the most numerous  (see table 1). In fact, light manufacturers-and 
more  generally,  companies  making  consumer  goods-were  more  deeply 
affected  than  the heavier  sectors by the initial  collapse of output  follow- 
ing the big bang. Furthermore,  they have continued to lag behind. 
Table  9 shows that  these companies  faced much stiffer  import  competi- 
tion (measured  by the growth  in the imports/domestic  sales ratio).  17 Ta- 
ble 10  shows that  they were able  to raise  prices  much  less following  price 
and  foreign  trade  liberalization  than  the other sectors. This table shows 
the remarkable  positive correlation  between the cumulative  producer 
price increases from December 1989 to June 1992 and the number  of 
AAA firms  in the different  sectors. 
17. In addition,  we suspect  considerable  competition  from  unrecorded  imports  of light 
goods, which  are  easier  to import  than  heavy  machinery. Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  237 
Figure 9.  Ratio of Other Income to Sales,  1991:1-1992:2a 
Percent 
2  -  J  AAAAA 
J*/ 
6  - 
2  A 
0  i  I  I  I  I  I 
1991:1  1991:2  1991:3  1991:4  1992:1  1992:2 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on firms  in the survey,  which  are sorted  according  to financial  performance. 
a. Other  income  consists  primarily  of sales and leasing  of assets. 
Table 9.  Import Competition by Sector,  1989-91 
Imports  as a percent  of sales 
Sector  1989  1990  1991 
Metallurgy  12.5  8.3  9.7 
Electromachinery  21.2  25.3  38.9 
Chemical  23.9  18.2  29.4 
Light  9.0  11.9  18.0 
Food  6.3  6.3  10.6 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Rocznik  Statystyczny  (various  issues). 
The differential  ability to raise prices constitutes the "good luck" 
component  of the success stories. Table 10 traces the dynamics  of the 
producer  price increases. The table shows that the bulk of the inflation 
took place in 1990  and  decelerated  thereafter.  In fact, 1990  inflation  can 
be interpreted  largely  as price  level and  relative  price  adjustment  follow- 
ing price and  trade  liberalization  on January  1. This leads to the conclu- 
sion that  prices for light  manufactures  were much  closer to world  prices 
than  were those for heavier  goods.  18 Tables  9 and 10  suggest  that  product 
market  competition  was higher  for A firms,  that  they faced more elastic 
demand, and that the random  pre-reform  allocation of resources for 
AAA firms  was more  in sync with the new price system. 
18. For discussions  of inflation  and price-level  adjustment  in 1990,  see Bruno  (1992), 
Pinto,  Coricelli,  and  de la Calle  (1990),  and  Wellisz,  Kierzkowski,  and  Okolski  (1991). 238  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table 10. Producer  Price  Increases  by Sector,  December  1989-June  1992 
Percentage  change 
Dec. 1989-  Dec. 1990-  Dec. 1991-  Dec. 1989- Number of 
Sector  Dec. 1990  Dec. 1991  June 1992  June 1992 AAAfirms 
Metallurgy  170.10  16.54  16.00  265.14  5 
Electromachinery  173.22  24.20  13.37  284.71  5 
Chemical  207.37  26.65  17.72  358.27  10 
Light manufacturing  108.58  21.86  9.85  179.21  3 
Food  144.22  39.85  16.69  298.54  8 
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Biuletyn  Statystyczny  (various  issues) and survey  data. 
Good Management 
AAA firms  are set apart  by their superior  ability  to sell and thereby 
improve  productivity  as labor  shedding  continues. As table  2 shows, la- 
bor  in this set of firms  was reduced  by 21 percent  on average-no  mean 
feat. Despite high capacity to pay PPWW as discussed above, AAA 
firms' wages remained  below national averages. AAA firms also re- 
strained  borrowing  and never let the interest burden  get out of hand. 
AAA firm  managers  were also apt to stress product  mix changes  and  im- 
proved marketing  as factors helping sales; were highly critical of the 
time wasted by the fine-tuning  of the PPWW  (discussed  below);  and  had 
the time  to focus on strategic  planning.  By contrast,  their  counterparts  in 
A firms  were bedeviled  by a crushing  debt  overhang,  the largest  average 
amount of labor and, as we shall see below, the highest excess em- 
ployment. 
But A firm  managers  have not been idle. These firms  reduced  labor 
the most. Like the other  firms,  A firms  have no problem  covering  materi- 
als and energy costs (as shown in table 3). Many A firms have also 
started  basic marketing  efforts and are focusing on improving  product 
quality.  Thus these firms  could show promise  with downsizing  and  debt 
restructuring  and should not be written  off. 19  In sum, managers  across 
the board  have defied  the stereotype of being inert and driven  by "per- 
verse"  incentives. Later  we shall see why. 
19. Blanchard  (1992)  discusses various  aspects of restructuring  enterprises  and deal- 
ing with the resulting  bad  loans problem  in banks.  Van Wijnbergen  (1992)  provides  a de- 
tailed  and  innovative  framework  for addressing  the enterprise-bank  nexus and  the role of 
banks  as agents  of change. Brian  Pinto, Marek  Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  239 
Governance 
The AAA companies  consist of 16 SOEs, as well as 13 commercial- 
ized enterprises and 2 private companies (which will be referred to 
loosely as the 15 commercialized  companies). In trying to ascertain 
whether  commercialization  helps, three  factors are worth  noting. First, 
firms  were commercialized  around  mid-1991,  leaving only one year of 
sample performance.  Second, as discussed earlier, commercialization 
has been driven by the desire to secure tax advantages  and to prepare 
for the beleaguered  mass  privatization  program,  not necessarily  by a de- 
sire to improve governance or to secure better managerial  incentives 
and performance.  Third, SOEs do not receive any special benefits and 
operate  on the same market  terms  as all other  companies. 
Appendix C compares the experiences of state-owned AAA firms 
with their commercialized  and privatized  counterparts  (labeled "other 
enterprises"  in the appendix tables). Commercialized  firms employ 
many more workers  (almost  800 more per firm).  They have lower sales 
and  labor  productivity,  but higher  loan amounts  and  interest  payments. 
They pay similar  wages but much less PPWW  out of disposable cash; 
pay much  higher  dividends  (asset taxes) as a share  of profits  after  income 
tax; and have been less profitable.  But if the two cigarette  companies  in 
the AAA SOE  group  are  excluded,  the indicators  for SOEs and  commer- 
cialized companies are similar (although commercialized  companies 
employ  far  more  workers  and  have a bigger  debt  and  dividend  burden)  .20 
On some key indicators, commercialized  companies seem to have an 
emerging  edge. 
The fact that commercialized  companies  are much  larger  and carry  a 
bigger  dividend  burden  indicates self-selection. The elimination  of the 
workers' council that accompanies commercialization  would simplify 
decisionmaking,  thus yielding a larger benefit to bigger companies, 
which are more unwieldy. Moreover, as explained earlier, managers 
hoped  that  the dividend  burden  would be reduced. 
The acid test of whether  commercialization  helps is how it is viewed 
by managers-the key players in the transformation.  Managers  in our 
20. Cigarette  companies  are immensely  profitable,  but also pay huge turnover  taxes. 
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survey recognized  the importance  of changes in governance.  They ex- 
pressed a distinct  preference  for commercialization  and, after restruc- 
turing,  privatization. 
Nonfinancial  Adjustment 
Hard  currency  exports took off in 1990.  This led to an almost  embar- 
rassingly  large increase in reserves that rendered  use of the $1 billion 
zloty-stabilization  fund unnecessary.21  However, our firm-level evi- 
dence  questions  the common  presumption  that  more  exports  mean  more 
adjustment.  An important  finding  of our  first  set of surveys was that  the 
export  boom  resulted  from  a switch  to the West  because  of weak domes- 
tic demand,  rather  than rising  export profits.  In fact, as we reported  in 
our 1992  paper, export  profitability  fell to low and even negative  levels 
by the first  quarter  of 1991,  mirroring  the real appreciation  of the zloty 
during  1990  and  early 1991  (when  the exchange  rate  remained  fixed  at its 
January  1, 1990  level). 
Diversion from the domestic and Eastern European  and Soviet ex- 
port  markets  to the West is obvious from  aggregate  data:  hard  currency 
exports  grew by some 40 percent, while total industrial  sales fell by 23 
percent and CMEA exports shrank  by 10 percent in 1990. However, 
what  is not so obvious is that  this meant  that  exporters  had  the ability  to 
meet Western  quality  standards.  The hard  currency  export  boom coin- 
cided  with  the persistence  of CMEA  trade  in 1990,  which  continued  sub- 
sidization  of energy (gas) and material  (iron ore) inputs. At the same 
time, trade  with the West was liberalized  and  the transferable  ruble/dol- 
lar  rate  (implied  by the zloty/dollar  and  zloty/transferable  ruble  rate)  de- 
preciated  significantly,  falling  from 2.97 TR/dollar  in 1989  to 4.52 TR/ 
dollar  in 1990.22 The boom was the most prominent  in the chemicals  and 
21. This fund was set up by a group  of Western  countries  to support  Poland's  fixed 
nominal  exchange  rate  anchor.  The fact that  it was not used does not mean  that  the fund 
was irrelevant;  it provided  an ex ante signal  of credibility. 
22. This can be seen by writing  a simplified  profit function in dollars as follows: 
profit ($) per unit of exports  =  p,  -  pjm(rE),  where p, is the (sticky) dollar price of unit 
exports  to the West,  pm  is the (sticky)  ruble  price  of imports,  m is the volume  of imported 
CMEA  inputs  per  unit  of exports  (fixed  by short-run  technology),  and  E is the implied  TR/ 
dollar  rate.  The  depreciation  of E raised  unit  profitability  of exports  to the  West  at the  same 
time  that  a demand  constraint  appeared  in the home  market. Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  241 
Table 11.  Management Response to 1990 Export Boom 
Percent  of total 
Exports 
Answer  involveda 
The same  productb  91 
Diversion  in 1990C  89 
Source: Based  on authors'  survey  of metallurgy  and chemical  firm  managers. 
a. Total  exports  refer  to the 1990  exports  of the firms  polled. 
b. Percent  of total  exports  involved  based  on managers  who answered  that  the 1990  export  boom  to the West  was 
a result  of diverting  the same  products  that  were  previously  sold to CMEA  countries  and  to domestic  Polish  markets. 
c. Percent  of total  exports  involved  based  on managers  who thought  that  firms  that  were  able  (because  of product 
quality  and technology)  to divert  exports  in 1990  without  waiting  for the 1991  collapse. 
metallurgy  sectors; both benefited  from  implicit  CMEA  subsidies  on in- 
puts. The relative profitability  of exporting to the West increased so 
drastically,  especially  for firms  importing  inputs  from  the East, that  it is 
likely that firms that could reorient did so en masse  in 1990, without 
waiting for the 1991 CMEA collapse and dollarization  of prices. It is 
tempting  to believe that  most of the reorientation  took place in 1990  and 
those firms  that were affected in 1991  were those that simply  could not 
sell in the West at any price. 
We tested this view by asking  managers  of metallurgy  and  chemicals 
firms two questions. First, did the hard currency export boom to the 
West in 1990  result  from diverting  the same products  earlier  sold in the 
CMEA and Polish markets  to the West or from selling new products? 
Second, did  firms  that  were able  to (because  of product  quality  and  tech- 
nology)  divert  sales from  the East to the West  immediately  in 1990,  with- 
out waiting  for the 1991  collapse?  Table 11 summarizes  the answers  we 
obtained.23 
The answers show that  firms  exporting  to the West in 1990  were sell- 
ing the same products and had diversified  to Western markets. How- 
ever, these firms  were not necessarily more competitive or better ad- 
justed than those selling at home under the pressure of low import 
barriers.  Although  exceptions are possible, as managers  pointed  out, it 
is almost impossible  to develop new products  and adjust  technology in 
one year. On implicit  CMEA subsidies, the clearest answer came from 
23. These  firms  were the same  subset  for which  we presented  regression  results  in our 
1992  paper.  The firms  represent  a significant  percentage  of total  metallurgy  and  chemicals 
exports  in 1990  (24 percent  and 33 percent,  respectively).  The regression  results  suggest 
that  weak  domestic  demand,  rather  than  rising  export  profitability,  stimulated  exports. 242  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
a manager  of a chemicals  firm  who said, "In 1990,  energy  in the form of 
gas was cheap. We exported  it in the form  of fertilizer." 
These results support  the view that in a neutral  trade  regime  like Po- 
land's during  the ETP-with  no anti-export  bias, no quota restraints, 
and low tariffs-more  exports as a rule do not mean more adjustment. 
Trade  liberalization  imposes discipline  on all firms  that produce  trada= 
bles, whether  exported  or sold at home. 
Dealing  with Social  Assets 
In the January  1990-March  1991  period  covered by our first  round  of 
surveys, worker housing and social assets (such as vacation resorts, 
health  centers, sports  amenities,  cafeterias,  kindergartens,  hostels, cul- 
tural centers, and vocational schools) presented a significant  financial 
and  huge  managerial  burden;  no apparent  solution  appeared  in sight. Al- 
though the problem  is still considered serious by managers,  evidence 
this year indicates  that imaginative  solutions have been developed, fo- 
cusing  largely  on cost recovery. 
Generally,  these assets are  taken  over by local communities,  often  for 
free, or rented  or bought  by small  and mid-size  private  firms  or by ven- 
tures set up by former  employees of the enterprise.  Rental  contracts  are 
common;  one firm  has no fewer than  54! Nevertheless, social assets re- 
main  on the books; sales are  difficult  because  the market  is saturated  and 
ownership  rights  remain  unclear.  The process of giving  the assets away 
is slowed by both  the costs for a potential  donor  (including  gift  taxes and 
the obligation  to establish clear ownership  title) and the reluctance to 
take on high  maintenance  costs. 
Worker  housing  is by far  the biggest  problem,  especially  for the larger 
firms,  although  the problem  is not as severe as last year. Managers  noted 
that  the financial  burden  had  eased because  of the rise in controlled  rents 
and  utilities,  which  also apply  to firm-owned  housing.  Many  offered  con- 
crete suggestions: 
Remove worker housing from the umbrella  of controlled  rents and 
utilities  and  permit  commercial  operation. 
Enact laws allowing eviction of nonworkers,  who benefit from the 
firm-financed  subsidies. 
-Create  a system of owner mortgages  (which would apply more gen- 
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Speed up clarification  of ownership  rights and titles to property so 
that  firms  could more  easily divest themselves  of such  property.  Flats 
could even be given away free.24 
While  posing an unnecessary  burden  in times of crisis, social assets 
never really weighed  that heavily in the cost structure.  For most firms, 
these costs accounted  for less than 2 percent of total cost; in only four 
firms  (out of 64) did this amount  surpass  5 percent. Managers  identified 
the easing of the managerial  burden  as the main  benefit  in resolving  is- 
sues surrounding  social assets and working  housing. It is worth noting 
that the Government  of Poland  has recognized  the need to address  title 
and ownership  of such "superfluous"  assets. It should also be stressed 
that at this stage, the problem  is largely  a legal one relating  to property 
rights  and  will not be solved by privatization  alone. To the contrary,  pri- 
vate investors  may be deterred  if this issue is not resolved. 
Improving Distribution 
In 1989, state-organized  wholesale trade, which had frequently  en- 
joyed (local)  monopoly  power, began  disintegrating.  By the end of 1990, 
liberalization  of wholesale  trade  fostered  growing  competition  from  pri- 
vate firms.  Coupled  with high  interest  rates  and  weakening  domestic  de- 
mand,  traditional  networks  in nearly  all sectors collapsed. 
This became a real challenge for SOE manufacturers,  never well 
equipped in marketing  and after-sales service and unaccustomed to 
dealing  with a multitude  of small  customers  who often were financially 
unviable.  Moreover,  the new traders,  consisting  predominantly  of small 
private  "wholesalers,"  preferred  dealing  with  private  importers  because 
of their  greater  flexibility  and  cooperation  in evading  taxes. The collapse 
of traditional  trade networks  greatly strengthened  import  competition, 
particularly  in consumer  goods, and  contributed  to the crisis in the state 
industrial  sector. 
After the initial shock, SOEs started responding.  Where possible, 
producers  have established  direct contact with the ultimate  consumers 
or with retailers. In metallurgy,  managers  reported  that in 1992 more 
than 80 percent of sales were direct deliveries to the ultimate  user; in 
electromachinery,  the percentage  was only slightly lower. Two years 
24. Otherwise,  a firm  would  have to buy  the asset at book  value  before  giving  it away. 244  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
earlier, steel mills had only a few customers-and  sometimes only 
one-who  would take care of the entire distribution  process. The pro- 
ducer  was fully isolated  from  the market. 
In consumer  goods sectors such as food processing and light manu- 
facturing,  a similar  process is underway.  More  than  half  of output  is sold 
directly to retailers to avoid wholesalers' commissions and contacts 
with partners  that are often small and unviable. Firms are getting rid 
of unreliable  partners, choosing better ones, and strengthening  them 
through  a system of price concessions and relaxed  terms  of payment  in 
return  for controls on prices and territorial  distribution  of deliveries. 
These arrangements,  however, are only part of the solution. The best 
firms are building  up their own networks of reliable distributors  for 
wholesaling  and storage, sometimes supplementing  these with factory- 
sponsored  retail  shops. 
Improving distribution  is not an easy task. It takes financial re- 
sources, resolution,  and competence. In many  respects, it is more diffi- 
cult for the SOEs to sell domestically than abroad, where quality re- 
quirements  are higher  but distribution  networks are better. All in all, 
improvement  of distribution  is one of the most important  indicators  of 
adjustment. 
Key Aspects of the Transformation 
Quantitative  evidence and our discussions with managers  indicate 
that  four stimuli  have been paramount  in inducing  firms  to adjust.  First, 
trade liberalization  has forced firms to abandon  cost-plus pricing and 
pay attention  to costs and efficiency-with  some success. Second, the 
government's  determination  to eliminate  manufacturing  subsidies and 
external  support  mechanisms  has compelled firms  to focus on internal 
efficiency and take the initiative  for change. Likewise, the realization 
that the government  does not have the resources for a bailout has led 
firms  to rely on their own resources to find  new products  and markets. 
Third, tighter supervision of state-owned commercial banks and in- 
creasing  reluctance  of good firms  to lend to weaker ones has hardened 
the budget  constraint.  Fourth, managers  care about their reputations, 
identify  their  own success with  the firm's,  and  realize  that  based  on their 
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Table  12. Changing  Funding  Structure  of A Firms,  January  1990-June  1992 
Percent  of total funding 
End of  End of  End of 
December  December  June 
Source  1990  1991  1992 
Working  capital  loans  94.60  57.50  47.30 
Investment  loans  25.10  18.80  19.80 
Capitalized  interest  1.20  1.90  1.90 
Tax arrears  7.39  15.77  24.23 
Interfirm  borrowinga  -28.39  6.04  6.71 
Source: Based  on authors'  calculations  of firms  in the survey  that had  a financial  performance  rating  of A. 
a. Interfirm  borrowing  is defined  as payables  minus  receivables. 
ized. This section discusses three elements of this transformation:  the 
hardening  of the microeconomic  budget  constraint,  PPWW  reform,  and 
managerial  attitudes  and  incentives. 
The Efficacy of Hard Budgets 
By and large, subsidies to SOEs have been eliminated.  Bank loans 
were also tightened  through  improved supervision  and control of the 
state-owned  commercial  banks  at the end of 1991.  Our  sample  evidence 
suggests  that  AAA firms  are  becoming  more  cautious  in lending  to other 
firms. The hardening  of the firm-level  budget  constraint  shows up viv- 
idly in table 12  on the changing  funding  structure  of A firms. 
A clear substitution  of interfirm  loans for bank loans occurred be- 
tween December  1990  and  December  1991.  Bank  loans  diminished  in im- 
portance  and were replaced  by a large increase in interfirm  borrowing 
and tax arrears. As a comparison of June 1992 and December 1991 
shows, tax arrears  have continued  to rise while bank  loans have contin- 
ued to drop and interfirm  borrowing  has stabilized. But tax arrears  do 
not represent  new sources of cash. The signal  is clear:  firms  should  not 
expect anyone  to bail  them  out.25  Thus  while it is difficult  to pinpoint  ex- 
actly when the budget  constraint  will have hardened,  the process is cer- 
tainly  moving  in the right  direction.  Interestingly,  A firms  have not been 
25. The main  leakage  now is tax arrears,  primarily  on the dividend  and PPWW.  This 
leakage  is difficult  to stem  without  introducing  bankruptcy,  which  is not credible  because 
of limited  court  capacity  and  high  social  costs. An alternative  may  be to handle  the arrears 
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Table 13. Bank Credit  and Financial  Opportunity  for Firms,  January  1990-June  1992 
Scale, 0-5 
January-  January-  January- 
Financial  December  December  June 
Question  performance  1990  1991  1992 
Ease of obtaining  AAA  3.0  2.8  3.2 
bank  credit  AA  3.1  2.4  1.3 
A  3.2  2.0  1.2 
Involvement  of banks  AAA  2.5  3.0  3.2 
AA  3.1  3.6  3.7 
A  2.4  2.6  2.8 
Source: Based  on authors'  survey  of firms.  Managers  were  asked  to identify  the ease of obtaining  bank  credit  and 
the extent to which  bankers  seek information  about  enterprise  operations,  and rank  them  on a scale of 0 to 5, with 
5 being  easiest. Responses  of firms  of similar  financial  performance  were then  averaged. 
idle. They shed the most labor  and  appear  to be operating  on an assump- 
tion of no bailouts.  Thus the share  of wages in gross value added  fell in 
1992  for these firms,  as shown in figure  7. 
The managers  we surveyed  felt that the firm-level  budget  constraint 
had hardened and was  now  credible. They unanimously reported 
changed  bank behavior. As they described  it, in 1990  banks acted like 
cashiers, eager to dole out money. By 1992,  banks were behaving  like 
partners  with an equity stake in the company and had become highly 
conscious of quality. Managers  also indicated that because of rising 
competition  among  banks  for the limited  number  of sound  clients, good 
firms  were bargaining  for lower interest  rates. 
Table 13 shows the changing  perceptions  of managers  over time re- 
garding  the ease of obtaining  credit  and  the extent to which  their  bankers 
seek information  about enterprise  operations. We labeled this feature 
"bank  involvement"  and based our averages  on a 0-5 point scale rank- 
ing.26  These results show that AAA firms  experience the same ease in 
getting  loans as in 1990,  while A firms  experienced a sharp  diminution 
in  1992. Impressively, all types  of  firms reported increased bank 
involvement. 
When asked why they believed bank behavior  was changing,  man- 
agers  commonly  gave two replies. First and most frequently,  managers 
stated that banks have no option but to change because of their van- 
ishing net worth and deteriorating  portfolios. Second, managers  said 
26. In such  responses,  the trend  is more  relevant  and  easier  to evaluate  than  the abso- 
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that banks, like enterprises,  are learning.  Although  managers  never al- 
luded to it, there is a remarkable  coincidence between perceptions re- 
garding  tighter  bank behavior  and the change in the governance  in late 
1991  of the nine commercial  banks spun off from the National Bank of 
Poland. Changes  included commercialization,  supervisory  board con- 
trol, and strict  monitoring  by the Ministry  of Finance,  including  a freeze 
in lending  to some 2,000 suspect firms. At the same time, banks have 
been benefiting from the skills acquired from twinning with foreign 
banks. 
The budget  constraint  is also hardening  internally.  Increasingly,  firms 
have installed  cash management  and reporting  systems. Profit  centers 
have been created  in some cases to pinpoint  responsibility  and  ease per- 
formance measurement.  There are unmistakable  signs that financial 
management  is strengthening. 
There  has been a remarkable  change  in interfirm  credit. Strong  firms 
are no longer interested in supporting  weaker ones. Firms frequently 
create their own ranking  lists of buyers, specifying  which will be dealt 
with only on cash terms, which will receive two weeks' credit, and 
which will not be supplied at all. Some make use of published lists 
of firms in conciliatory  proceedings  published in newspapers such as 
Rzeczpospolita. 
Tax arrears  is the area where the least change is visible, as table 5 
amply  showed. Not only has the dividend  (minimum  asset tax) criterion 
not been enforced  (firms  have found all sorts of ways to persuade  local 
tax chambers  that deferments  beyond the stipulated  three months for 
triggering  bankruptcy  were  justified),  but any large-scale  bankruptcy  is 
not credible  because of limited  court  capacity. 
Excess  Wage Taxation: Help  or Hindrance? 
Our  quantitative  evidence showed that AAA firms  were much more 
efficient  in labor usage than A firms. Table 14 contains managerial  as- 
sessments  of excess employment  as of mid-1992. 
The weighted average  of excess employment  (using the midpoint  of 
the ranges  in the table)  for A firms  is 14  percent  and  for AAA firms  is 11 
percent.  This seemingly  marginal  difference  needs to be put in context. 
A firms  are typically  larger,  more  labor  intensive and  have already  shed 
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Table 14.  Excess Employment in Firms, June 1992 
Number  of firms  responding 
Financial  Percent of excess labor 
performance  0  5-10  10-20  20-30  30+ 
AAA  2  14  11  2  0 
AA  2  4  1  1  0 
A  3  6  7  7  0 
Total  7  24  19  10  0 
Source: Based  on authors'  survey  of firms.  Managers  were asked  to assess their  firms'  demand  for labor. 
ported by A firms  is consistent with figure  7, which shows labor costs 
consuming  an  ever increasing  share  of value  added.  Labor  reduction  will 
obviously be an important  part  of any restructuring  plan  for A firms. 
Has PPWW helped or hurt labor rationalization?  Earlier results 
showed that PPWW  is paid by the best firms, which are also the least 
decapitalized. As  expected from an instrument as controversial as 
PPWW,  managerial  attitudes  were mixed, although  generally  negative. 
PPWW  was blamed for hampering  workforce rationalization  and flat- 
tening  the wage structure  because of the "average  wage norm"  basis for 
excess wage taxation.  On  a 0-5 scale, managers  rated  PPWW's  negative 
impact  on the wage structure  as a 4.3. 
Managers  cited a social, rather  than  an economic goal-the  desire to 
minimize  unemployment-as the reason behind the change in formula 
for wage indexation  from  the wage bill  in 1990  to the average  wage norm 
in 1991.  With  only four  exceptions out of 64, managers  believe the wage 
bill formula  is superior.  Any attempt  to shed labor, which is in excess, 
automatically  raises the average  wage. An extreme  example  of the per- 
verse effects of the average  wage norm  was given by a firm  in dire straits 
that shed 600 workers  (25 percent of its workforce)  and found it had to 
pay the PPWW because the average wage then exceeded the norm. 
Managers  complained  that the average  wage formula  directly  impeded 
workforce  management:  hiring  a good worker (who costs more) raises 
the average  wage, while  firing  a bad  worker  (who  costs less) does exactly 
the same. A wage bill norm would help speed up labor rationalization 
and  also improve  the relative  wage structure. 
Managers  frequently repeated the assertion they expressed in our 
first  set of surveys that strong  managers  with a clear, long-run  vision of 
the firm  did not need the PPWW  to contain wage demands. Managers Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  249 
expressed irritation  at having  to still deal with the PPWW,  whose role 
and  time  they felt had  passed. They complained  about  the time  it wasted 
and  the discrimination  it represented  vis-a-vis  the private  sector. On  the 
other hand, some managers  (of profitable  and unprofitable  firms  alike) 
said  that  the PPWW  presented  a solid  excuse for not raising  wages. Oth- 
ers complained  that it was impossible to offer workers rational  incen- 
tives, a constraint  private  firms  did not face. Managers  admitted  in 41 
out of 64 questionnaires  that  removing  the PPWW  would  result  in a wage 
increase. AAA firms  reported  that they were likely to raise wages more 
often and more generously than A firms. However, only a handful  of 
those that said they would increase  wages expected the  jump to exceed 
20 percent. Managers  identified  three influences  on wage setting:  firm- 
specific liquidity,  profitability,  and comparisons  with national  average 
wages.27  They regarded  the PPWW as having reduced relevance for 
wage setting  because of illiquidity  and  low profitability.28 
Some managers  complained  about  the discriminatory  enforcement  of 
the PPWW.  The manager  of one enterprise-which is profitable  and  cur- 
rent  in all payments  but whose wage is more  or less at the national  aver- 
age-cited  the example of a shipyard,  which was paying  about 30 per- 
cent more  than  the average  wage, was in arrears  on the PPWW,  and  had 
recently received a one-third  reduction  in debts (including  in accounts 
payable  to this manager's  firm).  Many  of the managers  we interviewed 
expressed such resentment  against  the most powerful  giants  of the Pol- 
ish industry. 
What about exceptions that give some firms  a break  on the PPWW 
based  on selected  efficiency  criteria?  Managers  strongly  opposed  excep- 
tions, even when they stood to gain  from  these. They mentioned  that  ex- 
ceptions  had  never  worked. One manager  cited an example  to show that 
well-meaning  changes  in policy, when  combined  with  other  policies, can 
have perverse effects. The proposed  incentive, whereby a 100  percent 
exporter  is exempted from the PPWW, could lead to a rush to export 
semiprocessed  steel; this in turn  could hurt  finished  steel producers  be- 
cause the  15 percent import tariff on  semiprocessed steel exceeds 
27. When  asked  the average  wage, managers  would  give it and  then  instinctively  com- 
pare  it to the national  average.  The national  average  is an important  yardstick  for trade 
unions. 
28. A firm  does not actually  have to be paying  the PPWW  for it to limit  wages. Merely 
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the 3 percent  tariff  on finished  steel. This example  points to the difficul- 
ties of making  exceptions  on PPWW  payments  based  on essentially  arbi- 
trary  criteria.  Managers  were quick  to point out that  during  the socialist 
era, all sorts of imaginative  schemes of exceptions had been tried and 
invariably  had  failed. 
Managerial  Attitudes  about the Government 
In our interviews, almost without exception, managers endorsed 
hard  budgets.  When  explicitly  asked, they were indifferent  about  import 
tariff  increases  designed  to help them. By and  large,  managers  expected 
the government  to stick to the original  Balcerowicz policies that were 
embraced  in the big bang.29  Most saw no alternative  and no chance of 
returning  to the old system. (Only nine had any doubts; four of them 
were from the beleaguered  light industry.) Managers  were emphatic 
about the determinants  of credibility.  They stressed the importance  of 
avoiding  subsidies  and  bailouts  and  of not capitulating  to strikes.30  Man- 
agers  emphasized  the need to control  the government  deficit  to avoid in- 
creases in inflation  and  interest  rates. They repeatedly  argued  that  plan- 
ning is very difficult if inflation stays high and volatile. In addition, 
managers  stressed  that  the government  must  be consistent  in its discus- 
sions and actions. They noted that government  officials  have discussed 
the possible need to let state enterprises  fail, at the same time that they 
have drawn  up a state budget  assuming  sizable  taxes from  the state sec- 
tor. Finally, managers  said that  the "stop-and-go"  attitude  toward  mass 
privatization  has considerably  reduced  the program's  credibility.  Man- 
agers of successful companies that were candidates for privatization 
were concerned  that the proceeds would go to finance  the deficit  rather 
than  to restructure  the company.31 
29. Leszek Balcerowicz,  Minister  of Finance  and Deputy Prime  Minister  in the first 
postreform  government,  is widely  regarded  as the architect  of Poland's  economic  transfor- 
mation  program. 
30. Managers  made  this statement  in the context  of strikes  occurring  in the summer  of 
1992.  At one point,  these threatened  to turn  into  a wave, but  fizzled  out as the government 
took  a hard  line-for  example,  in the case of the car  company,  FSM  Tychy,  that  was nego- 
tiating  with Fiat. Managers  expressed  little  sympathy  for strikers. 
31. At present, privatization  proceeds are treated  as current  revenue, even though 
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It is noteworthy  that  managers  did not include  the need for higher  im- 
port  tariffs  in their  list of expectations  from  the government.  Some man- 
agers  even recognized  the need for import  competition;  most were con- 
fident about their ability to deal with it. The only plea for protection 
came  from  a sugar  factory, motivated  by the European  Community  sys- 
tem for agriculture. 
The change in attitude  toward  the role of the government  is signifi- 
cant. In the days before the economic transformation  program,  the best 
managers  bargained  with the central  authorities  for favored  allocations 
of subsidies  and  investments  under  the central  investments  program  and 
delivered  the production  target  in return  without  regard  to marketability 
or cost. A typical manager  was an engineer, whose entire professional 
career  was connected  with  the same  enterprise;  as a specialist  in produc- 
tion, he knew little about marketing  and financial  management.  On the 
other  hand,  good managers  knew  how to deal  with social  conflicts  within 
firms,  a quality  still in high  demand  in Poland. 
Following the shock therapy of the ETP, managers  seemed over- 
whelmed  by the changes they had to deal with: big, sudden  changes in 
relative prices, a demand  constraint,  and import  competition.  In addi- 
tion, the SOEs-with  their social assets, old technology, excess em- 
ployment, and quality  problems-hardly seemed the ideal springboard 
to a market  economy. 1990  was a year  of unsustainable  performance  and 
minimal  adjustment;  temporary  favorable  factors  tided  firms  over. 1991 
was the year  of the CMEA  shock and  hope for  government  help-a  hope 
that quickly vanished. That experience marked  the start  of deeper ad- 
justment. Our  interviews  indicate  that 1992  was a year of self-help  and 
virtually  no expectation  of government  help. The only plea was for sta- 
bility in the rules of the game. This suggests that enforcement  of an- 
nounced  penalties  will  be easier. Because examples  of successful  adjust- 
ment can be pointed  to, and because expectation  of bailout  is limited  to 
a small number  of dinosaurs,  the government  can pursue a consistent 
policy without  a fear of a systemic backlash. 
pressure  on the government  to introduce  fundamental  spending  and  tax reform.  Privatiza- 
tion is discussed  further  below. In Poland's  mass privatization  program,  groups  of 15-20 
companies  will be managed  by national  investment  funds  to be run  by well-known  invest- 
ment  banks.  These banks  will be compensated  partly  through  a success fee linked  to the 
increase  in the companies'  value. See Frydman  and  others  (1993). 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Restructuring and Privatization 
Managerial  attitudes  toward  sequencing  were overwhelmingly  in fa- 
vor of commercializing  enterprises  (as opposed to remaining  SOEs) and 
restructuring  before privatizing.  Managers  voiced straightforward  rea- 
sons. Potential  investors  do not want  to talk  to workers'  councils  or deal 
with firms  burdened  with social assets, excess employment,  and  unmar- 
ketable  products. 
Interestingly,  managers  of commercialized  SOEs were more apt to 
stress improved  managerial  compensation,  while all managers  assessed 
job stability  about  equally. Also, managers  of commercialized  SOEs re- 
ported  more  positive relations  with trade  unions than managers  of pure 
SOEs, where the workers'  council complicates  the relationship. 
It is also noteworthy  that  without  exception managers  underlined  the 
need for restructuring  before  privatizing,  especially in view of the prob- 
lems of social assets, excess labor, enterprise  division, and in many 
cases, debt overhang.32 
Managers  expressed skepticism  about mass privatization  for several 
reasons. They cited lack of clarity  about  the role of national  investment 
funds  (NIFs) in relation  to a specific  firm,  and  the division  of responsibil- 
ity and authority  between firm  management  and NIFs. They discussed 
the problem  of the firm's  assets being "given"  to the NIFs, even though 
the NIFs would  not put  their  own money  at risk. Finally,  managers  men- 
tioned the perception  that the main  goal of the mass privatization  pro- 
gram  is to solve budgetary  problems,  not restructure  firms. 
Managerial  Compensation 
The system of managerial  compensation  remains  unchanged  in the 
SOEs, at least on paper.  Managers  still receive a multiple  of the national 
average wage or the firm's average wage (ranging  between five and 
seven times the basic wage) and  are  hired  by the workers'  council.33  The 
council determines  the basic wage. Managers  also receive a bonus pay- 
32. Pinto,  Belka, and  Krajewski  (1991, 1992)  describe  organizational  changes  in sam- 
ple firms  between  January  1990  and  March  1991. 
33. We encountered  a sole exception:  one manager  had negotiated  with the workers' 
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ment, but the legislatively fixed link of managerial  compensation to 
profits  is weak and has been diminishing  with time. Ironically,  this link 
was the strongest  in 1990,  when financial  measurement  was strongly  bi- 
ased by all sorts of temporary  factors. 
An example will show the extremely weak link between profits  and 
managerial  bonus. In 1990, if the firm  made profits  of $50 million (the 
base being  profits  before  tax minus  PPWW),  the managers'  bonus  would 
be about  $3,800  for the year. In 1991,  this bonus would  have dropped  to 
about $2,800  for the year. In a case where the manager's  basic wage is 
seven times the average  wage in the firm,  this amounts  to a onetinme  rise 
in monthly  wages of about  $45  in 1990  and  only $33  in 1991. 
When  managers  who had  clearly  engaged  in deep restructuring  (intro- 
ducing new products, venturing  into new markets, or bringing  firms 
back from  the verge of liquidation)  were asked what motivated  them to 
take a long-run  view given the compensation  system, they mentioned 
such motivations  as emotional  reasons, patriotism,  and personal  ambi- 
tion. However, a few candidly  admitted  that  they expected to gain  from 
privatization, hoping to acquire part of the shares at below-market 
prices. Such a benefit  would  be their  deferred  compensation.  Managers 
were secure about  keeping  theirjobs after  privatization.  They reasoned 
that  they are  the best repository  of restructuring  talent  in this economy; 
even if fired,  they expected to find  new  jobs easily. 
Lessons from Poland: Hard Budgets and Implicit 
Incentive Structures 
Hard  budgets,  import  competition,  and  concern  for managerial  repu- 
tation  can induce significant  restructuring  even when changes  in gover- 
nance  lag behind.  This  does not mean  that  commercialization,  privatiza- 
tion, and better managerial  incentives are redundant.  Managers-the 
key players in the transformation  of SOEs-expressed  a clear prefer- 
ence for commercialization  and  privatization  preceded  by restructuring. 
Further,  they expect to gain  when privatization  does arrive.  But a trans- 
parent  incentive  system may  be preferable  to this implicit  expectation  of 
gain  as uncertainty  about  the shape  and speed of privatization  grows. 
Although restructuring  has been impressive in successful and less 
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still on the books and excess employment  remains.  As the tables in ap- 
pendix  C show, even AAA companies  have a way to go in restoring  pro- 
ductivity  and sales levels (although  both factors have been rising since 
mid-1991).  What  is clear is that hard  budgets and competition  have led 
to substantial  restructuring.  With firms clearer about their long-term 
goals and the banking  system beginning  to work, SOEs are much  better 
prepared  for privatization  by whatever  means. In short,  the delay in pri- 
vatizing  has not led to wasted time or decapitalized  assets-thanks  to 
hard  budgets  and  competition. 
Hard  budgets are effective in inducing  enterprises  to transform,  but 
take time to become credible.  It was only after  mid-199  1-more  than 18 
months  after  the big  bang-that managers  were finally  convinced  that  no 
bailouts would occur. Tighter control over commercial  bank lending 
also did not occur until late 1991. Finally, better-off  firms  became in- 
creasingly  reluctant  to help less well-off firms  through  interfirm  credit. 
It is worth stressing  that despite periodic  political  instability,  the Gov- 
ernment of Poland held a consistent policy line-no  bailouts-even 
though  this stance may have appeared  unreasonable  at the time. Given 
the budget's tremendous  dependence on state sector enterprises, the 
government  apparently  had  every incentive  to reverse  policy, introduce 
protection,  and soften budgets. But it did not do so, and  eventually  firm 
managers  began  to believe the government's  hard  line. 
The rapid  elimination  of relative  price  distortions  that  flowed  from  big 
bang  liberalization  was also important.  Trade  liberalization  placed  tight 
constraints  on cost-plus pricing  behavior. Firms  were forced to look at 
efficiency and costs and at the marketability  of their products, rather 
than  simply  emphasizing  production  targets  as they had  in the past. With 
fixed exchange rates, foreign  prices provided  a nominal  anchor  for do- 
mestic prices, thereby not only establishing  clear signals and perfor- 
mance yardsticks,  but also imposing  discipline  on domestic  prices. The 
decisions to devalue in May 1991-the  first relaxation  of the fixed ex- 
change  rate 17  months  after  the big bang-and  subsequently  to move to 
a crawling  peg were initially seen as an undesirable  relaxation  of the 
nominal  anchor. However, they actually  helped by avoiding  excessive 
real  appreciation,  which  was beginning  to hurt  the tradables  sector. The 
changes coincided with a recovery in sales. While the shock of the big 
bang  and the initial  fixity of the exchange  rate  were invaluable  in estab- 
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the exchange  rate  fixed indefinitely  without  regard  to the real exchange 
rate.34 
A punitive tax-based incomes policy can control wage expansion, 
helping  to secure  the initial  goal  of stable  prices. However, if maintained 
for too long and  kept too finely  tuned  in its exceptions, such a policy can 
become a burden  and obstruction.  It is essentially  a penalty, not a good 
incentive or distributional  mechanism.  If current  goals are making  sure 
that  firms  earn  profits  and  that  long-run  investments  take  place, it would 
be better to use more direct incentives, such as linking  managerial  pay 
to profits  or changing  governance  to emphasize  long-run  considerations. 
Managerial  performance and attitudes highlight the vital but ne- 
glected role of managers  in the economic transformation  and underline 
the importance  of reputation  effects and implicit  incentive structures  in 
affecting  managers'  behavior. On the surface, SOE managers  have no 
stake in those enterprises,  either  in terms of ownership  or profit-linked 
compensation.  But managers  believe that good performance  will be re- 
warded  at the time of privatization  and that their  reputation,  and hence 
compensation,  will depend  upon their  performance  today. This is a ma- 
jor factor  in explaining  why SOE firms  have been more  farsighted  than 
expected. 
Summing  up, Poland's  experience  shows that  shock  therapy  can have 
valuable effects by giving an unambiguous  signal, changing relative 
prices, and indicating  the government's  commitment  to hard  budgets. 
But Poland's experience also shows that rapid changes in ownership 
may  be unnecessary,  and  that  restructuring  before  privatization  may be 
desirable. 
APPENDIX  A 
Description  of the Sample and Data 
THE  75 FIRMS in the sample  are drawn  from  five manufacturing  sectors: 
metallurgy;  electromachinery;  chemicals;  light manufacturing  (such as 
textiles and leather);  and food processing.  The original  criterion  for se- 
34. It is well-known  that the nominal  exchange rate cannot determine  the real ex- 
change  rate;  the issue is more  one of consistency  between  fiscal  policy, inflation,  and  ex- 
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lection  was 1989  sales value;  we attempted  to select 15  firms  from  among 
the 21 largest in each sector. However, we eliminated  obvious giants 
(the  biggest  steel mills  and  shipyards)  because  these would  dominate  the 
statistical  calculations.  Out  of the 75 firms,  we successfully  revisited  73. 
(One  was in liquidation  and  the other  was under  investigation.)  Eventu- 
ally, 64 firms  completed  the questionnaires. 
The SOEs examined  employ 1,500-6,000  workers, although  one ex- 
ceeded 20,000. A typical sample  firm  is not a giant URSUS-type firm, 
which gets much media  attention  but is no longer  representative  of the 
state sector. Annual  sales of the sample  firms  are in the region  of $100 
million. Products sold by these enterprises  include pipes, rails, metal 
sheets, wire, machine  tools, transformers,  electric  engines, railway  car- 
riages, refrigerators,  and bicycles (metallurgy  and electromachinery); 
fertilizer, plastics, and organic and inorganic chemicals (chemicals); 
fabrics, clothes, hosiery, shoes, and leather goods (light manufactur- 
ing); and meat products, sugar, processed fruit, chocolate, and ciga- 
rettes (food  processing).  Virtually  all the firms  were SOEs at the start  of 
the economic transformation  program,  with powerful workers' coun- 
cils, two (or more)  trade  unions, and management  legally subordinated 
to the workers' council. By 1992, almost half had been "commercial- 
ized" (transformed  into entities wholly owned by the Treasury)  and 
three had been privatized.  The enterprises  are located all over Poland, 
both  in the big industrial  centers (Krakow,  Poznan, Upper  Silesia, War- 
saw, and Wroclaw)  and in smaller  cities (in such areas as southeast  Po- 
land, Bydgoszcz, Piotrkow  Trybunalski,  Radom,  Szczecin, and  Torun). 
Table Al summarizes  the percentage  shares  of sample  firms  with re- 
spect to total sector sales, employment,  and exports. To some extent, 
the sectoral classification is  artificial:  convenient for statistical re- 
porting,  but not necessarily for a study of adjustment.  In this respect, 
the sample contains sufficient product and geographical  variance to 
draw  interesting  conclusions. 
The Data 
The data set from  each enterprise  included  statistical  information  for 
the period June 1989-June  1992  and answers to a qualitative  question- 
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Table  Al.  Sector  Shares  of Sample  Firms 
Percent  of total 
Sector  Sales  Employment  Exports 
Metallurgy  38.0  41.4  25.9 
Electromachinery  9.4  7.8  11.0 
Chemical  32.2  30.1  39.8 
Light manufacturing  7.9  8.1  9.1 
Food processing  9.1  8.3  2.4 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on firms  in the survey  and  Rocznik  Statystyczy  (various  issues). 
The statistical  information  included  monthly, quarterly,  and yearly 
information.  Forty-two variables were collected on a monthly basis. 
These included  information  on value of sales, costs of sales, subsidies, 
turnover  tax, extraordinary  gains  and  losses, gross  profit,  tax payments, 
net profit,  inventories  (total  and divided  into inventories  of raw materi- 
als, work-in-progress,  and finished goods), cash balances, credit out- 
standing, interfirm  credit (payables and receivables), dollar deposits, 
employment, the wage bill, and the PPWW  norm. Twenty-four  quar- 
terly variables  were collected, including  information  on total costs in- 
curred, structure  of costs, and imports (not available in many firms). 
Thirty-six  variables  were collected on a yearly  basis, including  informa- 
tion on value of fixed assets, investment  expenditures,  profit  distribu- 
tion, tax obligations,  and  tax arrears. 
The qualitative  questionnaire  focused on the following:  optimism  and 
expectations  about  the government,  including  the credibility  of policy in 
the third year of the economic transformation  program;  labor adjust- 
ment  and  reactions  to the excess wage tax; the enterprise-bank  relation- 
ship  and  the role of banks  in the transformation  of firms;  the social assets 
problem and potential solutions; and long-run  strategy, including se- 
quencing  of restructuring  and privatization. 
APPENDIX  B 
Accounting  Framework 
THE ACCOUNTING  CONVENTIONS  used  in this paper differ somewhat 
from  standard  U.S. conventions. Our  conventions  correspond  to Polish 
accounting  conventions and are adapted  to fit the information  that was 258  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
available  to us on Polish  firms  participating  in our survey. In this appen- 
dix, we first  present  a sample  statement  of income that  we used to tabu- 
late gross profits. We then provide accounting  definitions  that we em- 
ployed to make  the tabulations  in this paper. 
Statement of Income 
(?)  Revenues 
Sales (main  business) 
Other  income 
Subsidies  (all) 
Sales and  leasing  of assets 
Financial income 
(-)  Costs of Revenues 
Costs of sales 
Materials  and  energy 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Wage  cost (see definition  below) 
Other 
Turnover  tax 
Costs of other  income 
(+)  Balance  of extraordinary  gains and  losses 
(=)  Gross Profit (also pretax profit) 
Accounting Definitions 
Disposable  cash  =  Gross profit  -  income  tax  -  dividends 
+  depreciation 
Net other income  =  Other  income -  costs of other income 
Underlying  profitability =  (Sales -  cost of sales)/Sales 
=  (Gross profit  +  turnover tax  -  net other 
income  -  balance of extraordinary 
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Net  profit  =  Gross profit  -  income  tax  -  dividends 
-  PPWW 
PPWW  =  Polish acronym  for excess wages tax 
(wages paid in excess of indexation 
norm). 
Wage cost  =  Basic  wage  +  payroll tax  +  social 
insurance  contributions 
Wage cost before 1992  =  Wage bill x  1.65 
(This assumes a 20 percent payroll tax and 45 percent 
contributions  to social insurance.) 
Wage cost  in 1992  =  Wage bill  x  1.2  x  1.45 
(This reflects payment of social insurance  contributions  on gross 
wages.) 
APPENDIX  C 
A Comparison  of State-Owned  AAA Firms 
with Privatized  and Cotnmercialized  AAA Firms 
THIS APPENDIX  compares  the experiences  of state-owned  AAA  firms 
with their commercialized  and privatized  counterparts.  In June 1992, 
commercialized  and privatized  AAA firms  averaged  3,316 workers  per 
firm,  while AAA SOEs averaged  2,528 workers  per firm.  Average sales 
in 1991  for commercialized  and privatized  AAA firms  were $85.8 mil- 
lion;  forAAA SOEs, they were $112.4  million.  Of  the 15  commercialized 
and privatized  firms, 2 produced  electromachinery,  7 were chemicals 
firms, 2 were in light industry, and 4 were food processors. Of the 16 
AAA SOEs, 5 were in the metallurgical  sector, 3 produced  electroma- 
chinery,  3 were chemicals  firms, 1  was in light  industry,  and  4 were food 
processors. Tables  Cl through  C8 summarize  other  financial  character- 
istics of AAA firms,  distinguishing  among  SOEs, SOEs excluding  ciga- 
rette  companies,  and  commercialized  and  privatized  firms.  (The  last cat- 
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Table  Cl.  Real Sales  of AAA  Firms,  December  1989-June  1992 
Index, September  1989= 100 
December  June  December  June  December  June 
Firm governance  1989  1990  1990  1991  1991  1992 
All SOEs  100.0  72.4  73.5  74.5  80.4  91.2 
Subset of SOEsa  99.0  62.9  62.5  51.9  57.5  55.1 
Other  enterprisesb  97.2  64.0  77.8  57.4  56.7  58.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  AAA  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  enterprises. 
Table  C2. Labor  Productivity  of AAA Firms,  December  1989-June  1992a 
Index, September  1989  = 100 
December  December  December  June 
Firm governance  1989  1990  1991  1992 
All SOEs  97.5  76.6  92.2  113.3 
Subset of SOEsb  98.0  68.1  70.6  71.9 
Other  enterprisesc  96.2  85.3  68.8  74.0 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  Productivity  is measured as output per person-hour. 
b.  AAA  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
c.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  enterprises. 
Table  C3. Ratio  of Working  Capital  Loans  to Sales  for AAA Firms 
Percent 
December  December  December  June 
Firm governance  1989  1990  1991  1992 
All SOEs  33.6  80.9  63.2  54.5 
Subset of SOEsa  28.3  93.1  82.8  75.2 
Other  enterprisesb  28.4  58.1  91.8  75.5 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  AAA  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  firms. 
Table  C4. Ratio  of Total  Interest  to Sales  for AAA  Firms 
January-  January-  January- 
December  December  June 
Firm governance  1990  1991  1992 
All SOEs  1.1  1.2  1.1 
Subset of SOEsa  1.3  1.8  1.8 
Other  enterprisesb  2.8  4.7  6.9 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  AAA  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
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Table C5.  Average Wages for AAA Firms 
Thousands  of zlotys  per worker 
December  December  December  June 
Firm governance  1989  1990  1991  1992 
All SOEs  721  1703  2370  2285 
Subset  of SOEsa  755  1768  2434  2202 
Other enterprisesb  602  1911  2119  2187 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  AAA  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  firms. 
Table C6.  Ratio of the Excess Wage Tax to Disposable Cash for AAA Firms 
January-  January-  January- 
December  December  June 
Firm governance  1990  1991  1992 
All AAA  SOEs  9.1  17.7  11.3 
Subset  of AAA  SOEsa  8.2  16.6  10.4 
Other enterprisesb  10.6  19.7  4.1 
Source:  Authors' calculations based on AAA firms in the survey.  Disposable  cash is pretax profit plus depreciation 
minus income  taxes  and dividends. 
a.  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  firms. 
Table C7.  Ratio of Dividends to Profits after Income Taxes for AAA Firms 
Percent 
Januaty-  January-  January- 
December  December  June 
Firm governance  1990  1991  1992 
All SOEs  5.2  8.6  10.9 
Subset  of SOEsa  6.1  12.2  15.3 
Other enterprisesb  10.8  25.9  24.8 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on AAA  firms in the survey. 
a.  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  firms. 
Table C8.  Underlying Profitability of AAA Firms 
Percent 
January-  January-  January 
December  December  June 
Firm governance  1989  1990  1991  1992 
All AAA  SOEs  31.0  30.3  33.5  36.8 
Subset  of AAA  SOEsa  27.3  22.4  18.4  15.8 
Other enterprisesb  27.3  24.1  17.4  16.6 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on AAA firms in the survey.  Underlying profitability is the difference between 
sales and cost  of sales divided by sales. 
a.  SOEs  excluding  cigarette companies. 
b.  Commercialized  and privatized AAA  firms. Comments 
and Discussion 
Andrei Shleifer: All over Eastern Europe, reformers  are asking the 
same  questions:  what  policies will allow  emerging  enterprises  to restruc- 
ture, to find new markets,  and to become more efficient. Generally  in 
Eastern  Europe, answers  are based on theoretical  priors  about  the wis- 
dom of various  strategies,  without  much  evidence. The excellent paper 
by Brian  Pinto, Marek  Balka, and Stefan Krajewski  begins to provide 
evidence about  what  policies are really  needed  to achieve restructuring. 
In my comments,  I will first  discuss five questions  relevant  to an analysis 
of restructuring;  then I will examine  the paper's  evidence for answers. 
The first  fundamental  issue is whether  privatization  is necessary. Can 
state enterprises,  in some form, actually  restructure  if put  into an appro- 
priate  environment,  complete with such favorable  factors as hard  bud- 
get constraints  and managerial  incentives?  There  are two views on this 
issue. The first  maintains  that privatization  is necessary. Policymaking 
in Russia  is very much  driven  by this view. In contrast,  in Poland  so far, 
large-scale  privatization  has not occurred  (although  various  other  policy 
changes bearing  on enterprises  have been much more dramatic  than in 
Russia). 
The second debate concerns the need for corporatization  and com- 
mercialization  of state enterprises.  Does it help state enterprises  to be 
set up as independent  entities with boards  of directors  (or with supervi- 
sory  boards,  as in Poland)?  One  view is that  it does help. Another  view is 
that  all state firms,  commercialized  or not, respond  to the government's 
political  objectives, rather  than  working  to maximize  profits. 
The third  important  issue is the role of competition.  Firms  that  enjoy 
either monopoly rents or quasi-rents  often spend them on excess em- 
ployment  or excess wages or perquisites.  But when firms  face product- 
market  competition,  the amount  of waste and inefficiency  that they can 
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sustain  to pursue  political  objectives  is considerably  reduced. Consider 
a few examples. Presumably,  Lufthansa  has high  employment  and new 
planes because the German  government  wants to have a fancy national 
carrier.  When  Lufthansa  begins to operate  in open Europe, it will have 
to become more efficient, even if it remains a state-controlled  enter- 
prise. Further  east, Poland  has largely  opened  up its economy to compe- 
tition. Russia has not at all; the real threat  is that the government  will 
consolidate  existing state monopolies. 
The fourth  issue is the role of hard  budget  constraints  and the reduc- 
tion of state subsidies. The issue here is not so much  whether  hard  bud- 
get constraints  are needed;  just about everyone agrees that they are. 
When firms  remain  subject  to soft budget  constraints,  they respond  to 
the objectives  of the government,  rather  than  those of profit-maximizing 
shareholders.  The government  will pay firms  to meet these objectives 
and  nothing  efficient  will ever result. 
The real question  is how to get hard  budget  constraints.  One view is 
that  a stringent  monetary  policy goes a long way. As long as the govern- 
ment adheres  to fixed exchange rates or must otherwise  pursue a tight 
monetary  policy, it will lack the resources  to subsidize  firms.  According 
to this view, monetary  restraint  suffices  to harden  budget  constraints. 
A second view is that  the banking  system must  be reorganized.  Banks 
must  be commercialized  or privatized  so that  they stop channeling  cred- 
its to enterprises  irresponsibly.  A third  view, which I favor  based on my 
experience  in Russia, is that  privatization  is required  to get hard  budget 
constraints  because firm  managers  need very high-powered  incentives 
to restructure. This view implies that monetary restraint, and even 
banking  reform, will not suffice to harden the budget constraint. Of 
course, this view is partly  based on the hopelessness of Russian  macro- 
economic  policy in 1992. 
A subsidiary  question relating to hard budget constraints is what 
forms  state subsidies  take. In Poland,  firms  are subsidized  through  bank 
loans, inter-enterprise  arrears,  enterprise  loans, and tax arrears.  These 
methods  of subsidies  are substitutes.  In Russia, in contrast,  they appear 
to be complements. 
The final  issue is managerial  incentives. The Polish  privatization  pro- 
gram  was driven  by the idea that  to restructure,  firms  need blockholders 
(large  shareholders),  managerial  incentives, and  bankruptcy.  In Russia, 
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abandoned  because of managers'  tremendous  political influence. The 
extent to which managerial  incentives are needed  for restructuring,  and 
in what  form, are very much  in the forefront  of this debate. 
The paper sheds light on each of these five fundamental  issues rele- 
vant  to the analysis  of restructuring-which is why it is so valuable. 
What  about  the evidence? The authors'  starting  point  is that some re- 
structuring  has indeed occurred  in Poland. The authors  report  that all 
firms  in their sample are shedding  labor; an average over a couple of 
years is an astounding  27 percent. Poorly  performing  firms  are shedding 
more labor than well-performing  firms, which is evidence of restruc- 
turing. 
It is less clear whether this evidence reflects better incentives for 
some firms'  managers  or better  luck. The authors  also find  that sales of 
profitable  firms  have increased somewhat  or at least have not fallen as 
much in real terms as sales of poorly performing  firms. But the strong 
firms  are the ones whose relative prices have increased  in the sample; 
they had good luck. These firms  are moving  along their supply curves; 
their prices and quantities  have risen (in relative terms). So while all 
firms  appear  to be restructuring,  some are facing much more favorable 
conditions  than  others. 
Polish data suggest that privatization  is not needed for restructuring 
because so far, no privatization  to speak  of has occurred  in Poland.  The 
question  is how Poland  achieved  restructuring  without  privatization.  To 
begin, what is the role of corporatization  and commercialization?  The 
paper  presents some evidence on the relative  performance  of state en- 
terprises  and  commercialized  enterprises. 
The evidence appears  to be completely  the reverse  of what  one would 
expect. In terms  of profit  relative  to output  and  various  other  measures, 
state enterprises  are performing  much better than commercialized  en- 
terprises. State and commercialized  firms  might  have been drawn  from 
very different  populations.  Even so, this paper  does not provide  an em- 
pirical  case for the need for commercialization  alone. 
Is competition  needed  for restructuring?  The  paper  presents  no direct 
measures  of competition,  but the evidence shows greater  employment 
cuts in firms that experience relatively greater price declines, which 
might  reflect  demand  shocks. This  evidence supports  the view that  com- 
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The paper  argues  that budget  constraints  have tightened  in Poland.  I 
think the evidence is not as clear as the authors suggest. First, when 
working  capital loans to enterprises  are standardized  by cost of sales, 
these loans have roughly  doubled  for all firms,  for A firms,  and  for AAA 
firms  from the end of 1989  to mid-1992.  Working  capital  loans have ex- 
panded  considerably  for all enterprises  in the sample;  this does not seem 
like a tremendous  tightening  of budget  constraints. 
Second, substitution  is occurring  among the types of subsidies that 
the firms  receive. At the very end of the sample  period,  after  the banking 
system has been commercialized,  the role of working  capital  loans for 
poorly performing  enterprises  declines. At the same time, inter-enter- 
prise loans to these enterprises  expand (they are not paying  their  bills), 
as do their  tax arrears  (they are not paying  their  taxes). As to the ques- 
tion, "Have  overall  budget  constraints  tightened  for these enterprises?" 
I am left a little bit skeptical.  None of these firms  has really  gone bank- 
rupt  yet. None of them  has yet been financially  restructured,  as least in- 
sofar as I can tell from this paper. It is true that the banking  system is a 
little bit tougher  toward  them, but they are able to get cash elsewhere. 
So I think  the evidence is suggestive  that  budget  constraints  are  tight- 
ening  in Poland.  At the same time, the end of the paper's  sample  period 
raises  a puzzle. At some point, some sort  of credit  has got to give. Either 
the government  will come back and bail out the A enterprises,  or they 
will run  out of cash. In the paper's sample, it is not clear yet which will 
occur. 
Another relevant  piece of evidence is that bank reorganization-as 
opposed to initial tightening  of monetary  policy that took place at the 
beginning  of 1990-has played an important  role in reducing  bank  loans 
to state enterprises.  This suggests that monetary  policy alone, without 
banking  reform,  might  not suffice  to harden  budget  constraints. 
The final  issue is that of incentives. In Poland, enterprise  managers 
have not received any very direct high-powered  incentives. This con- 
trasts  with Russia  and  the former  Czechoslovakia,  which  have put more 
effort  into providing  managers  with incentives:  Russia  through  manage- 
ment ownership and the Czech and Slovak republics through both 
management  and blockholder ownership. Poland plans to introduce 
blockholders  through  a mass privatization  program,  but that program 
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The authors argue indirectly  that incentives work in Poland. First, 
managers  want  to behave  well to be retained  in the future,  when the mar- 
ket economy really arrives. Second, managers  want to shape up their 
enterprises  to attract  foreign  investment  to get cheap shares  of reasona- 
bly good enterprises  when privatization  occurs. These two incentive 
mechanisms  suffice. Of course, managers  might  want to trash  their en- 
terprises  before  privatization  so they could  buy shares  very cheaply  and 
restructure  later. How incentives work  is a little ambiguous. 
What conclusions can be drawn?  Obviously Poland is doing some- 
thing right. The economy is growing, with more than half its employ- 
ment now coming  from the private  sector. Enterprises  are shedding  la- 
bor. Restructuring  is taking  place. Poland  has opened up its economy. 
Compared  to Russia, Poland  is paradise. 
But what is responsible  for the success? The picture here is a little 
murkier.  It appears  that  competition  has played  some role and  that  some 
hardening  of the budget  constraints  also took place (although  it is very 
difficult  to conclude  from  this paper  that such  hardening  was critical).  In 
the end, it is still unclear  how to get a lot of restructuring  of state enter- 
prises without  privatization. 
General Discussion 
Olivier  Blanchard  observed that  the slow pace of privatization  in the 
former centralized economies that had disillusioned many Western 
economists was, in retrospect,  not surprising.  According  to Blanchard, 
the explanation  is quite simple. Privatization  is, basically, taking  jobs 
away from workers  in plants that have to be closed; workers are pro- 
foundly  opposed to that prospect. In the absence of alternative  jobs or 
severance  pay, privatization  is likely to remain  slow. Many  economists 
feared  that  without  rapid  privatization,  state  firms  would  be in limbo  and 
deteriorate quickly, and assets would be wasted. The paper's mes- 
sage is that  the slowness of Poland's  privatization  process is less cause 
for concern. However, Blanchard  argued  that the surprisingly  strong 
position of Polish state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs) sampled  in the paper 
does not imply  that  privatization  is not needed. Rather,  the paper  shows 
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prises have been in a viable holding  pattern.  But the holding  pattern  it- 
self depends on the expectation that privatization  will eventually take 
place. Blanchard  concluded  that  the major  cost of the slow speed of pri- 
vatization  may  just be the opportunity  cost of not achieving the gains 
from  privatization  sooner. 
Andrei  Shleifer  did not doubt that Polish SOEs were in a successful 
holding pattern, waiting for privatization, but stressed that the iim- 
portant  question  for other economies in transition  was how the favora- 
ble performance  during  the holding  period  was being achieved. In view 
of firms'  use of new types of credit, he questioned  whether  hard  budget 
constraints  were actually  in place. Pinto argued  that the substitution  of 
one source of credit  for another  was not without  limit. He also believed 
that a major  reason for success during  the holding  period is that firms 
realize that there will be no bailout, and that managers'  future  jobs are 
dependent  on the viability  of their  enterprises. 
Richard  Cooper  wondered  whether  the holding  pattern  would  endure 
in the long run,  as in Italy or Spain, where state-owned  enterprises  con- 
tinue to exist. He asked whether  substantial  economic growth  and new 
entry  of firms  were occurring  in Poland,  which would  dilute  the share  of 
SOEs over time. Pinto  replied  that  in 1992,  growth  in the manufacturing 
sector was positive, and would have been positive overall, except for a 
drought  that depressed the agricultural  sector. Poland is thus the first 
Eastern  European  economy to turn around.  Also, new entry has been 
significant-not only in the transportation  and service sectors, but in 
manufacturing,  as well. Pinto  ventured  the guess that  new firms  account 
for as much as one-quarter  of manufacturing  sales. Cooper also won- 
dered whether markets in assets were emerging. Pinto identified the 
growth of income in the "other"  category, which mainly has been in- 
come from leasing assets, as evidence that asset markets  were devel- 
oping. 
Several  participants  questioned  the source  of incentives  for managers 
to manage  well. Pinto stated that managers  of SOEs are motivated  in 
part  by the promise  of financial  reward  that  they would  earn  upon  priva- 
tization.  In addition,  they are  concerned  about  their  reputations  because 
these would be important  when they had to borrow  to purchase  shares 
in their  companies  in the future.  Hence, in his view, managers  would  be 
unlikely  to strip  down their  firms  in order  to be able  to buy them  cheaply 
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William  Brainard  asked whether managers'  perception  of competi- 
tion in their product markets was an important  additional  discipline. 
Pinto  replied  that  imports  offered  increasing  competition.  He pointed  to 
evidence that suggested that prices in various sectors were restrained 
by world  prices, reflecting  Poland's  status as a small, open economy. In 
addition,  many firms  in his sample had reorganized  their management 
structures  to make  their  second most important  position  finance  or mar- 
keting, rather  than production,  as before. This suggests that firms  are 
placing  a greater  emphasis  on the need to be competitive  in the market. Brian Pinto, Marek Belka, and Stefan Krajewski  269 
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